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The 1998 settlement between state Medicaid agencies and thefive major tobacco companies heralded a new form of litigation in which individual or
government plaintiffs allied with privateclass action attorneys use economic,
politica4 and moral leverage to extract huge settlements from entire industries. Beginning with several class action suits filed in late 1999 against
managed care companies by aggrieved HAO enrollees, and continuingwith
government suits against the paint and handgun industries, this new form
of litigationhas become a powerful vehicle for plaintiffs to punish unpopmlar-but entirely legal-industries.
In this Note, the author demonstrates that the popular appeal of these suits
conceals legal theories of recovery that probably could not survive courtroom
scrutiny. The author argues that the thin legal merits of these class action
claims are often toleratedby courts, who urgesettlement in orderto clear their
dockets, and by the industries,who regardsettlement merely as a cost of doing
business. The author concludes that the tobacco litigation and its progeny
encourage citizens and the executive branches of government to seeh, restitution andfundamental social change in the courts after losing in the legislative arena, thusforcing thejudiciay branches into the unwise and improper
role of poligmaker.

INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 1998, the attorneys general of forty-six states and
their allies in the plaintiffs' bar negotiated a settlement agreement
with the five major cigarette manufacturers.' The deal, worth a stag-

gering $206 billion over twenty-five years, will reimburse states for the
expenditures that their Medicaid programs made for treating tobaccorelated illnesses. 2 The attorneys general praised the settlement as a
victory in the decades-long battle against one of the public health's
primary enemies.3 The repercussions of the groundbreaking settlement, however, are only now becoming apparent.
Emboldened by their success against the tobacco companies and
fueled by the hundreds of millions of dollars in fees that they collected, many of the attorneys who brokered the tobacco deal rekindled their alliance to take on another unpopular industry-health
1 See Barry Meier, Laqers in Early Tobacco Suits to Grt $8 Billion, N.Y. Ti'tEs, Dec. 12,
1998, at Al; 46 States Agree to $206 Billion Tobacco Settlement, LaLu'i, Wv., Nov. 23, 1998, at
1 [hereinafter Tobacco Settlement], available at 1998 WL 12498764. The settlement agrce-

ment that the forty-six states reached followed four settlements that Minnesota, Mississippi,
Texas, and Florida reached individually. See id. The settlements that these four states negotiated exceeded $40 billion, bringing the total bill for tobacco companies to $246 billion. See id.
2 See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 1, at 5.
3

See Sabin Russell, Disputeover States'Setlemcnt on Tobacco, S.F. CHRON.,

NoV. 17, 1998,

at Al. During a press conference following the settlement President Clinton proclaimed,
"Today is a milestone in the long struggle to protect our children from tobacco. This
settlement ... is dearly an important step in the right direction for our country." Id.
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care. 4 In the fall of 1999, less than one year after defeating the tobacco companies, these attorneys filed several class action lawsuits
against health maintenance organizations (HMOs) on behalf of the
HMOs' members.5 The lawsuits allege that the defendant HMOs
breached a duty by failing to disclose to their members that the HMOs
render health care decisions based not only on medical need but also
on treatment cost. 6 These plaintiffs seek nothing less than fundamen-

tal change: According to one plaintiffs' attorney, "'our lawsuit is the
last line of defense for millions of men, women, and children who
were sold a bill of goods at the expense of their health. They have
asked us to change this unconscionable system through the courts,
7
and that is what we will do."'
Litigation involving the tobacco and managed care industries is
troubling because it may punish defendants for marketing entirely legal products and services. Regardless of one's opinion on smoking,
cigarettes are a lawful product enjoyed by more than a quarter of all
Americans, most of whom are well aware of the risks. 8 Despite the
widespread awareness of these risks, ambitious legal strategies compelled tobacco companies to pay a record settlement.9 Similarly,
HMOs may be under the gun for simply doing what their charters
entail. During the 1980s, HMOs evolved as a market response to control the skyrocketing costs of health care. 10 HMOs reigned in these

expenses by balancing a patient's medical needs with the cost of providing treatment."1 If the plaintiffs succeed in their lawsuits, however,
the likely result will be a dismantling of the cost-containment systems
that HMOs employ. 12 A plaintiff victory would thus be truly ironic
4

See AlissaJ. Rubin & Henry Weinstein, 5 MajorHMOs Targeted in Class-Action SuitI,

L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1999, at Al.

5 See Steven Syre & Charles Stein, Tobacco Lawsuit Spinoff May Cause Waves in Market,
ARIz. REPUBUC, Oct. 24, 1999, at D5, available at 1999 WL 4204335. Among the HMOs
named in the lawsuits are PacifiCare Health Systems Inc., Foundation Health Systems Inc.,
Cigna Healthcare, Prudential Health Care, and Humana Inc. See Rubin & Weinstein, supra
note 4. These lawsuits were subsequently transferred to and consolidated in the Southern
District of Florida. The district court recently dismissed the plaintiffs' claims without
prejudice. See infra note 139.
6 See, e.g., Class Action Complaint
7, 9, 10, Pickney v. Cigna Corp., No. 2:99 (V
327 (S.D. Miss. filed Nov. 22, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cigna Class Action
Complaint].
7 Joseph Nocera, First: Who's Running This Country, Anyway? We, the Lanyers, FoRtNE,
Nov. 8, 1999, at 38, 38-39 (quoting Richard Scruggs, the Mississippi plaintiffs' attorney who
successfully attacked the tobacco industry), available at 1999 WL 27632997.
8
See GEORGEJ. ANNAS, SoME CHoIcE: LAW, MEDICINE, AND THE MiuxT 181 (1998).
9 See Tobacco Settlement, supra note 1, at 1.
10 See GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH: HMOs AND THE BRFAKDOWN OF MEDiCAL TRusT 22-26 (1996); infra Part II.B.
11 See ANDERS, supra note 10, at 25-26; infra Part II.B.
12
SeeJack Mabley, Editorial, Who Are the Winners, Losers in This Picture?,DAILY HERALD
(Chicago), Oct. 8, 1999, at 18 (arguing that dismantling HMOs will revive the trend in
American health care of twenty years ago when premiums increased 20% annually), availa
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because the removal of incentives that keep doctors from overtreating
their patients will return Americans to the system of health care that
3
they rejected just twenty years ago.'
A plaintiff victory against HMOs would be not only short-sighted,
but also a disturbing first step down the proverbial slippery slope. Already, suits against other unpopular industries-gun manufacturers
and the former makers of lead paint-are in progress.' 4 Suits against
these industries, however, are difficult to justify. In contrast to the
tobacco industry, for example, the paint industry did not engage in a
systematic deception of the American public.', Indeed, in the case of

paint companies, a culpable party is especially difficult to find because
the alleged wrongdoing occurred more than a generation ago. 16 Similarly, suits against gun makers are problematic because the industry at
best only indirectly causes the injuries suffered by victims of gun violence. 17 The party most responsible for the harm is the person who
pulled the trigger.18 Nevertheless, gun makers and the paint industry,
along with HMOs, are learning what tobacco companies already
know: when enough financial and political pressure is brought to bear
against an unpopular corporate defendant, it becomes irrelevant that
the corporation's business is legal and the plaintiffs' legal grounds for
recovery are weak.
This Note demonstrates that the tobacco settlement is indeed
portentous litigation. Not only did the settlement christen a new form
of class action in which the lawfulness of a defendant's business is insufficient to shield it from liability, but the tobacco litigation and its
progeny encourage citizens who lost in the legislative arena to co-opt
the courts, forcing the judiciary into the unnatural and perhaps improper role of social policymaker.
be at 1999 WVL 26395866; infra Part III.E. Scegneerally Editorial, Don't Let Lazqers SttleH
MO

Issues, STATEJ.-REG. (Springfield, Ill.), Oct. 7, 1999, at 4 (arguing that HMOs %ill pass on
their litigation costs to their members in the form of higher premiums), available at 1999

'VL 23250262.
13
See Mabley, supranote 12; infra Parts I.B, III.E. Seegenerallv Editorial, supra note 12.
14
SeeRichard L Cupp,Jr., Editorial, Tobaccos BigLoss Sets a Bad Prdcedent,USA To Y,
Nov. 24, 1999, at 31A (discussing how the tobacco settlement between the state attorney
general and cigarette companies encouraged other government entities to bring suits
against the paint and firearms industries), available at 1999 WL 6859779; infra Part IV.A-B.
Richard Cupp is a professor of law at Pepperdine University School of Law. See Cupp,
supra.
15 See Kenneth Smith, Editorial, Toxic Lawyers: Lawsuits May Ke-p the Lead In, WASH.
TiMEs, Nov. 18, 1999, at A19, availabe at 1999 WL 3099208; infra Part IV.A-B.
16 SeeJudyth Pendell, Editorial, Trial Lawyers' Next Target: The PaintIndushy, Wu. ST.
J., Oct. 18, 1999, at A49 (stating that the deception with which the paint makers are
charged occurred in the 1920s and 1930s); infra Part IV.A2. Judyth Pendell is the Executive Director of the Center for Legal Policy at the Manhattan Institute. Se Pendell, supra.
17 See David Kairys, Legal Claims of Cities Against the Manufacturs of Handguns, 71
TaaP. L REv. 1, 12-13 (1998).
18 Seeid.
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Part I of this Note provides a brief history of the tobacco litigation
that is the fountainhead of the current lawsuits against tie managed
care industry, gun manufacturers, and the former makers of lead
paint. This Note in Part II surveys the history of health care in
America, reviews the crisis faced by the traditional system, and discusses the solution that managed care appeared to provide. Part III of
this Note discusses class action lawsuits recently filed against HMOs,
the proposed theories of recovery, and some of the litigation tactics
employed. Part III also critiques the merits of the managed care lawsuits and concludes that victory for the plaintiffs would be harmful to
the American health care system. Part IV examines the use of certain
litigation strategies, borrowed from the tobacco suits, against gun
manufacturers and the paint industry. Finally, in Part V, this Note
argues that these lawsuits are an unwise attempt to turn over to the
courts what should be legislative policy decisions.
I
TOBACCO LITIGATION

After a winning streak that spanned more than forty years,' 9 strategic lawyering finally brought cigarette manufacturers to the bargaining table, and in November 1998, the tobacco industry and the
0
attorneys general of forty-six states reached a landmark settlement.2
Pursuant to the agreement, the five major tobacco companies agreed
to reimburse the states' Medicaid agencies over $200 billion for the
costs of treating tobacco-related illnesses. 2' In return, the states
22
pledged to forgo any future lawsuits against the tobacco companies.
This remarkable turn of events was the result of an ingenious new
legal strategy that circumvented the fundamental flaws of previous tobacco litigation.
A.

The First Wave: 1950s and 1960s

Litigation by smokers against tobacco companies falls into three
distinct temporal waves, each distinguished by a different plaintiff legal theory. 23 The first wave involved lawsuits during the 1950s and
1960s in which plaintiffs utilized theories of deceit, breach of war19
20
21

See infra Part IA-B.

See Tobacco Settlement supra note 1, at 1.

See id. at 5.
22 See id
23 See Susan E. Kearns, Note, Decertificationof Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1336, 1338 (1999).
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ranty, and negligence. 2 4 In Lartiguev. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,2 5 the
widow of a lifetime smoker brought suit against a group of cigarette
makers, alleging that the defendants' cigarettes caused her husband's
lung cancer.2 6 Thejury, in finding for the defendants, concluded that
the tobacco companies could not have foreseen the harmful effects of
smoking.27 This result proved typical of the period.28
For every case like Lartigue that made it to trial, plaintiffs filed
dozens more.2 9 These other cases did not reach settlement-settle-

ment was a result no tobacco company considered an option. Rather,
the plaintiffs' attorneys felt compelled to abandon their cases because
of the "king of the mountain" strategy that tobacco companies employed. 30 During this first wave of litigation, tobacco companies ex-

ploited their financial advantage by taking every deposition, filing
every motion, and pursuing every alternative, all in an effort to bankrupt their opponents-a strategy that almost always worked.31 If
plaintiffs could sustain their suits long enough to reach a jury, the
32
question the jury faced was not causation but foreseeability.
During the early years of tobacco litigation, whether smoking
posed any harm was still an open question. For the most part, the
public still believed that the cigarette manufacturers knew of no link
between smoking and disease.33 However, cigarette makers actually
knew otherwise, and when that secret became public a generation
24 SeeIngrid L Dietsch Field, Comment, No If4 Ands orButts: BigTMbaco IsFigltingfor
Its Life Against a New Breed ofPlaintiffsArmed uith MountingEvidence,27 U. RLT. L RE,. 99,
100-01 (1997).
25 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
26 Id. at 23.
27 See id. at 3940.
28
Field, supranote 24, at 101.
29 Tucker S. Player, Note, After the Falk The CigarettePapers,tMe GlobalS&tltment, and the
Future of Tobacco Litigation, 49 S.C. L REv. 311, 313 (1998).

30 Richard A. Daynard & Graham E. KelderJr., Tie Many Virtues of Tobato Litigation,
Tuiu, Nov. 1998, at 34, 35. In an internal memo, a tobacco lawyer summed up the benefits of a "king of the mountain" defense: "'To paraphrase General Patton, the ay we won
these cases was not by spending all of [the tobacco company's] money, but by making [the
plaintiff] spend all his.'" Id (quotingJ. MichaelJordan, an attorney who defended R.J.
Reynolds in the 1980s).
31
See id. at 35. As an example of this strategy, Daynard and Kelder cite the case of
Rose Cipollone, who brought a landmark tobacco lawsuit during the second wave of tobacco litigation. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986); Player,
supranote 29, at 318-19. In the Cipollone case, parties filed more than one hundred motions and four interlocutory applications, and the trial lasted four months. See Daynard &
Kelder, supra note 30, at 35. The Cipollone case, which eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court, cost the plaintiff's attorneys more than $3 million in out-of.pocket expenses
and lawyer and paralegal time. See id. at 35-36.
32
See Field, supranote 24, at 105-06. In Lartigu4 a suit filed during the first %,veof
litigation, the trialjudge'sjury instructions excluded from liability 'manufacturered products, the harmful effects of which no developed human skill or foresight can [avoid]." 317
F.2d at 39.
33 See Field, supranote 24, at 106.
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later, it provided plaintiffs with powerful ammunition.3 4 Nevertheless,
throughout the first wave of lawsuits, the tobacco companies responded to the plaintiffs' challenges with overwhelming success. The
companies' defense seemed unassailable: because a link between
smoking and illness remained unproven, the plaintiff could not show
that the defendant knew its product to be harmful; thus, the plaintiff's
breach-of-warranty claim collapsed. Even if a smoker could overcome
this hurdle, he still faced the scorn of a jury who believed he had
35
contributed to his own injury.
The first wave of litigation came to a close with the publication of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.36 The Restatement seemingly codified
the tobacco companies' defense by stating in a comment that "[g] ood
tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of
smoking may be harmful." 3 7 Many commentators viewed this statement as an indication of per se immunity for the tobacco industry.
Courts, in turn, responded by nullifying claims against cigarette
companies.38
B.

The Second Wave: 1980s

Smoking victims lost badly during the first wave of tobacco lawsuits. Before mounting a second challenge, assistance and a change
in tactics was necessary. The government provided help in 1964 when
the Surgeon General concluded that smoking was incontrovertibly a
threat to health. 3 9 In response, Congress passed the Cigarette Acts of
1965 and 1969.40 The 1965 Act required the placement of a warning
on all cigarette packaging. 41 The warning announced: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health."4 2 To keep states
from subjecting cigarette makers to inconsistent labeling require34
35

See id. at 121-22; infra Part I.B.
See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Morality Play's Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, Frand and

Consumer Choice in "Third Wave" Tobacco Litigation,46 U.

KAN.

L. Rv. 465, 471 (1998) ("Tile

assumption of risk defense has 'hovered like a storm cloud over every smoker's claim
against the tobacco companies.'" (quoting Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on SmohingRegulation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 475, 493 (1991))). During the first and second waves of tobacco

litigation, many juries viewed smokers as "villains, pathetically attempting to foist responsibility for their vices on others." Id. at 506.
36 See Player, supra note 29, at 314.
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965); see Player, supra note 29, at
314.
38 Player, supra note 29, at 314.
39 Id. at 314-15.
40 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282
(1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994)); Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (amending the 1965 Cigarette Act);
Player, supra note 29, at 315.
41 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act § 4.
42 Id.
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ments, Congress prohibited any other warnings from appearing on

cigarette packaging. 43 Ironically, this provision would turn out to be
one of the tobacco companies' favorite defenses. 44 In addition, the
1969 Act banned all cigarette advertisement from television and
radio. 45
Plaintiffs' lawyers were very busy in the interim between ie first
and second litigation waves. Because the theories of recovery they argued during the first wave of lawsuits failed, plaintiffs' attorne)s
sought a change in tactics. One new idea was to attack the presumption created by the Restatement (Second) of Torts by asserting that cigarettes were unreasonably dangerous and that their manufacturers
should incur strict liability for the harm they caused. 46 Legal theorists
also provided plaintiffs' lawyers with additional tools. 47 The new risk-

utility theory reasoned that a manufacturer should be liable for injuries that its product caused if the product's risks outweighed its beneficial effects.4 8 Plaintiffs' attorneys felt that they could apply this theory
to the cigarette industry on the basis that the social enjoyment of
smoking did not outweigh the consequent increased cost of health
care. In addition, the rise of comparative fault removed the all-ornothing results previously available to plaintiffs under the traditional
49
assumption-of-risk rationale.
Tobacco companies did not rest as their adversaries prepared
new strategies.5 0 To counter the Surgeon General's evidence, the tobacco companies pointed to the findings of the Council on Tobacco
Research, a research organization funded by the tobacco companies
that disputed the existence of a link between smoking and disease. 1
Moreover, in response to the growing belief that nicotine was addictive, tobacco defense lawyers began pointing to examples of numerous ex-smokers who had quit the habit cold turkey.5 2 Finally, to

preclude courts from applying the risk-utility test, tobacco lawyers argued that no one knew of an alternative, safer design for cigarettes.
43
44

1 § 5.

45
46

See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 § 6.
See Player, supra note 29, at 315-16.

47

See id.

48

See id.

49

See id.
See id. at 316.

50

51 Id One of the most embarrassing revelations to come to light during the third
wave of tobacco litigation is the fact that tobacco companies used the Council on Tobacco
Research (CTR) as nothing more than a public relations tool, particularly as a means to
perpetuate the debate over the connection between smoking and illness. Id. at 323-24.
Tobacco companies also made sure that attorne)s were involved in all aspects of CTR research so that tobacco attorne)s could invoke attorney-client privilegc and tie work product doctrine to deny plaintiffi' attorne)s access to CTR research. Id.
52

Id. at 318.
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In some states, tobacco lobbyists even persuaded legislatures to pass

bills requiring courts to use the consumer expectations test rather
than the risk-utility test-a test more favorable to cigarette makers.511
In the end, the result of the plaintiffs' new theories and the manufacturers' new defenses was the same as in the first wave of litigation:
not a single victory for smokers.5 4 As in the first wave, the majority of
cases never made it to trial as the tobacco companies simply outspent
their opponents.5 5 In the few cases that did make it to trial, for most
juries, the issue remained simple: smokers chose to engage in an activ56
ity they knew to be harmful.
The Cigarette Acts ironically helped cigarette makers defend
themselves by limiting the extent of state regulation of tobacco packaging and by providing cigarette companies with a preemption defense. The extent of the preemption defense, however, was unsettled

among federal district courts and courts of appeals; in 1991, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve the differences.5 7
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 58 involved a plaintiff who was a lifetime
smoker, and whose husband continued the lawsuit individually and as

executor of her estate following her death from lung cancer.59 Plaintiff Rose Cipollone sought recovery alleging breach of express warranty, failure to warn, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to
misrepresent or conceal material facts. 60 The defendants argued that
61
the Cigarette Acts preempted such claims.
The Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone62 was badly fractured.
Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, held that the Cigarette Acts pre-

empted Cipollone's failure-to-warn claim. 63 In reaching his conclusion, Stevens laid down a narrow rule of statutory construction that
53
Id. at 316-17 ("Under a consumer expectations test, plaintiffs cannot recover if they
knew the product was harmful to their health.").
54
Id. at 319.
55
Field, supra note 24, at 106; Daynard & Kelder, supra note 30, at 35.
56 Player, supra note 29, at 317.
57 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 499 U.S. 935 (1991) (granting certiorari); Player,
supra note 29, at 317.
58 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
59 Id. at 183. At the trial level, the court awarded Mrs. Cipollone's husband $400,000
to compensate for the damages he suffered as a result of his wife's cancer. Thejury, however, found Mrs. Cipollone 80% at fault for her illness. Under New Jersey comparative
fault law, a plaintiff more than 50% liable for her injuries cannot recover. See 693 F. Supp,
208, 210 (D.N.J. 1988), affid in part and rev'd in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), affd in
part and reu'd in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Player, supra note 29, at 318.
60
See 789 F.2d at 184.
61
See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (DN.J. 1984), rco'd,
789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986); ANNAs, supra note 8, at 182. The issue for the Court, therefore, was whether the 1965 and 1969 Cigarette Acts precluded smokers and their families
from suing tobacco companies under state tort laws. See 789 F.2d at 184-88.
62 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
63 Id. at 524 (plurality opinion).
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required the resolution of stated preemption questions via analysis of
only the express language of the statute, without consideration of the
overall statutory scheme or the law's legislative historyfr'
Although the result in Cipolloneforeclosed attacks against the tobacco companies based on failure to warn of the dangers of smoking, 65 the decision was largely a victory for plaintiffs. The Court in
Cipolloneessentially approved most of the intentional tort theories that
the plaintiffs asserted. 66 Despite this, the decision did not alter the
dynamics of tobacco litigation which, for forty years, had resulted in
nothing but defeat for plaintiffs. 67 If plaintiffs were to succeed against
the tobacco industry, they would need a fundamental change in
strategy. 6s
C.

The Third Wave: 1990s to Present

The two flaws that proved fatal to the first and second waves of
litigation were plaintiffs' inability to match the tobacco companies'
war chests and juries' lack of sympathy for plaintiffs who willingly exposed themselves to harm.69 The current, third wave of tobacco litigation embodies innovative solutions to these problems. 70 First, to
match the resources of their opponents, plaintiffs have begun to unite
by filing class action lawsuits on behalf of thousands, sometimes millions, of smokers. 7 ' This tactic allows plaintiffs to rely on a team of
well-financed and well-organized lawyers from dozens of law firms and
stands in stark contrast to the prior situation in which a solo practitioner attempted to fund a lawsuit while representing just one victim.7 2 Second, to deny the tobacco companies the use of their
powerful assumption-of-risk defense, plaintiffs' lawyers may now sue
for damages using "blameless" plainiffs. 7 3 These new legal tactics,
64 See id. at 518 (plurality opinion); AN,,.s, supranote 8, at 183. TheJustices debated
the extent of preemption in two dissenting opinions. Justice Blackmun, writing for himself
and Justices Kennedy and Souter, would have found none of Cipollone's state claims
barred. 505 U.S. at 534 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun reasoncd that preemption language could not be interpreted in isolation, but must be read in context of the
whole statute. Id at 535 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In a second dissent, Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Thomas, would have found all of Cipollone's common law claims preempted. Id. at 544 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). ForJustice Scalia, statutory language should be
given its "ordinary meaning." Id. at 548 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65

See ANNAs, supra note 8, at 185.

66

See 505 U.S. at 530-31; Field, supra note 24, at 113.
See Player, supra 29, at 319.
See Field, supra note 24, at 114-15.
See Player, supra note 29, at 313, 316.
See Field, supra note 24, at 114-16; Kearns, supranote 23. at 1340.

67

68
69
70
71

72

See, eg., Field, supranote 24, at 112.
See id. at 114.

73 See Kearns, supra note 23, at 1340. The first such blameless group of plaintiffi was a
group of flight attendants exposed to secondhand smoke. See Broin ,. Philip Morris Cos.,
641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Kearns, supra note 23, at 1340. The flight attend-
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combined with tobacco industry confessions,7 4 characterize the third
wave of tobacco lawsuits. The new strategies allow plaintiffs to level
the playing field between themselves and the tobacco companies. For
the first time, plaintiffs have a chance to hold cigarette makers accountable for half a century's worth of injuries and illness.
1. Medicaid Reimbursement Suits
So far, the new strategies employed during the third wave of tobacco litigation have produced two unique methods of recovery. The
more successful of the two involves lawsuits that state attorneys gen-

eral, allied with private attorneys, have initiated seeking damages for
the costs incurred by their state Medicaid programs in treating tobacco-related illnesses. 75 The Attorney General of Mississippi filed the
first of these lawsuits in 1994 in conjunction with private plaintiffs'
attorney Richard Scruggs. 76 Scruggs was the attorney who first conceived of using a "blameless" state agency, Medicaid, as a plaintiff in a
suit against the tobacco companies. 77 The tactic effectively denied the
tobacco companies their assumption-of-risk defense; against the state,
tobacco companies could not argue that the plaintiff had engaged in
voluntary exposure to harm from cigarettes. 78 Interestingly, Scruggs is
the same attorney who would make headlines several years later as the
leader of a group of attorneys filing class action lawsuits on behalf of
79
aggrieved members of HMOs.

The benefits of this new strategy quickly became apparent to
other attorneys general, and soon the tobacco industry faced Medicaid suits from nearly every state in the country.8 0 In November of
1998, the overwhelming breadth of these legal challenges forced the
tobacco industry to settle forty-six of the state claims for an amazing
ants "made attractive plaintiffs because they neither chose to smoke nor voluntarily exposed themselves to environmental tobacco smoke." Id.; see also Cupp, supra note 35, at
471 ("A unifying theme of the recent third wave tobacco cases is their effort to structure
recovery theories in a manner that minimizes focus on consumer assumption of risks in
choosing to smoke.").
74 See Cupp, supra note 35, at 481.
75 See Kearns, supra note 23, at 1340.
76 David A. Hyman, Tobacco Litigation's Third-Wave: HasJustice Gone Up in Smoke? 2J.
HAmTH CARE L. & POL'Y 34, 36-37 (1998); Adam Bryant, W0ios Afraid of Dickie Scmggs?,
NEvswvEEK, Dec. 6, 1999, at 46, 49. Scruggs and the Mississippi Attorney General were
friends. Hyman, supra, at 37.
77

See Hyman, supra note 76, at 37. "Medicaid is a joint state-federal program which

provides funding for medical and nursing home care for the poor." Id. at 36. States provide between 22% and 50% of the funding for Medicaid. Id.
78 See i&at 37 &n.19.
79
See Plaintiffs' Lawyers Step Up Pressure Against HMOs, LuBI.rr WV,
available at 1999 WL 13960687.
80
See Cupp, supra note 35, at 476-77.

Nov. 29, 1999,
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$206 billion, to be paid over the following twenty-five years. 8 1 This
agreement followed settlements reached by the tobacco companies
82
and four states for $40 billion.

2. Class Action Lawsuits
The second prong of lawsuits comprising the third wave of tobacco litigation involves class action lawsuits filed on behalf of millions
of addicted smokers. Until recently, this challenge to the tobacco
companies had met with less success than the Medicaid reimbursement suits. Although these lawsuits possessed the two hallmarks of
successful tobacco litigation-a lot of money and blameless plaintiffs 3-courts had been reluctant to certify such large classes of
84
plaintiffs.
Then, in July 2000, ignoring the concern other courts expressed
over a lack of commonality, a Florida state court allowed a tobaccorelated class action lawsuit to reach a jury for the first time.s The
jury, citing the industry's blatant fraud and misrepresentation,
awarded an amazing $145 billion to the 500,000 Florida smokers repSee Tobacco Satlement, supra note 1, at 1.
See id. The four states that settled earlier were Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota. See id. These states received more money than they would have under the national
settlement, as well as nonmonetary concessions that the remaining fortysix states did not
receive. See Michael V. Ciresi, An Account of the Legal StrategiesThat Ended an Er of Tobacco
Industry Immunity, 25 Wss. MrrcxauEL L REv. 439, 441-42 (1999); Daynard & Kelder, supra
note 30, at 42. The Mississippi, Florida, and Texas cases settled on the eve of trial, and the
Minnesota case settledjust before the case was to go to thejury. Se Tobacco &Utlemnent, supra
note 1, at 1.
83 This prong began as a single, nationwide class action lawsuit, Castano v. American
Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), r'd, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). Castano
purported to represent "[a]ll nicotine dependent persons in the United States." Id. at 549.
The plaintiffs were well financed and constructed a representation team of over sixty law
firms. Field, supra note 24, at 115. According to the plaintiffs, the tobacco companies
concealed the addictive nature of nicotine and manipulated the levels of nicotine in cigarettes to increase their addictiveness. Castano, 160 F.R.D. at 548. This theory shifted the
blame from smokers to the tobacco companies and allowed the plaintiffs to gain the moral
high ground. See Cupp, supra note 35, at 473.
84 Keams, supra note 23, at 1354-55. The district court certified the class largely out
of a desire to avoid the millions of individual lawsuits it saw as the alternative. Casano, 160
F.R.D. at 555-56. In rejecting this rationale, the court of appeals criticized the district court
for basing its decision on efficiency without considering how variations in state law might
affect the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23; Castano,84 F.3d at 740-45. The Fifth Circuit was
also suspicious that the plaintiffis' novel theory of recovery, addiction, would involve questions unique to each individual, thus destroying the commonality of the class. Id. at 742-43
n.15. Finally, the Fifth Circuit explained that "[t]he collective wisdom of individualjuries
is necessary before this court commits the fate of an entire industry or, indeed, the fate of a
class of millions, to a single jury." Id. at 752.
85
See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1996)
(certifying class of affected Florida smokers); Kearns, supra note 23, at 1354-55; Adam Cohen, Smoked., Tum, July 24, 2000, at 44, 44.
81
82
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resented in the class action.8 6 The award was by far the largest in U.S,
civil court history and greatly exceeded the combined market value of
8 7
the five corporate defendants.
Much of the success that plaintiffs have realized during the third
phase of tobacco litigation is attributable to the thousands of inculpatory documents that anonymous industry insiders have recently

brought to light

a8

These leaks from high-level officials paint a picture

of an industry that engaged in a deliberate campaign of deceit and
fraud against the American public.8 9 These embarrassing documents
have added much weight to plaintiffs' theories of conspiracy, deceit,
and fraud, and have played an important role in the third wave of
tobacco litigation. 90 Perhaps most damaging has been the evidence
that tobacco companies were aware of the dangers of smoking and the
addictive nature of nicotine well before even the Surgeon General,
but chose to deny the existence of such findings. 9 1 As the truth about
cigarette makers came to light, juries no longer viewed smokers as the
only culpable party, but saw them rather as victims of a manipulative
92
and deceptive industry.
As the third wave of tobacco litigation continues to play out, its
repercussions extend well beyond the parties involved. Most noticeably for the purposes of this Note, the recent successes of the tobacco
litigation spawned similar legal attacks on other American industries,
See Cohen, supranote 85, at 44.
See id. at 45. Although the $145 billion verdict is less than the $206 billion for
which tobacco companies settled the Medicaid reimbursement suits, see supra note 81 and
accompanying text, the Florida award poses a greater threat to the tobacco industry's economic viability because thejudgment may require a lump-sum payment rather than a payment over a term of years. See Cohen, supra note 85, at 45. Ironically, if the Florida verdict
stands, it could leave state governments rooting for the survival of tobacco companies to
ensure the complete reimbursement of state Medicaid agencies.
88
SeeANNAs, supranote 8, at 197-98; Cupp, supra note 35, at 474; Field, supra note 24,
at 121-22.
89 See Field, supra note 24, at 120-22.
90 Cupp, supra note 35, at 489 ("New evidence of fraud by tobacco manufacturers is
likely the most important factor distinguishing the third wave cases from earlier litigation."
(footnote omitted)); Field, supra note 24, at 122, 124. Specifically, evidence of fraud may
anger jurors and change their focus from the blameworthiness of the plaintiff-smoker to
that of the deceptive cigarette maker. See Cupp, supra note 35, at 489-90.
91 See Field, supra note 24, at 121 n.232.
92
See, e.g., id. at 124. The tide of litigation might even be turning against the tobacco
industry in what has historically been its area of greatest strength: suits brought by individual smokers. In California, ajury recently awarded a lifetime smoker $3 billion in punitive
damages for the smoking-induced cancer that now threatens to kill him. See Gordon Fairdough, Philip Monis Is Hit with $3 Billion Verdict, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2001, at A3.
The viability of suits brought by individual smokers received a recent boost when the
U.S. Supreme Court declined to review and effectively upheld a Florida case in which the
jury awarded an individual plaintiff damages against a tobacco company. See Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 121 S. Ct. 2593 (2001) (mem.), denyingcert. to 778 So.
2d 932 (Fla. 2000); Henry Weinstein, High Court Lets Smoker Award Stand, LA. Tmts, June
30, 2001, at Al.
86
87
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including providers of managed care, gun manufacturers, and the
paint industry. However, those who cheer the fate of cigarette makers
may find much less to celebrate as these other industries begin to

grapple with these aggressive new plaintiff tactics.
II
A BRIEF HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERIax

A.

The Development of Unlimited Health Care

The recently filed class action lawsuits against managed health
care companies come at a time when many Americans have a low
opinion of the health care industry. Stories ofjust how bad managed
health care can be have embedded themselves in the American
psyche. Newspapers and commentators swarm to report the horror
stories: the patient denied crucial tests because her HM1O wanted to
save a little money,93 or the nurse who misdiagnosed a patient because
she was working far from her patient, sitting at the other end of an
HMO's telephone "hofline."94 Stories like these motivate lawyers like
Richard Scruggs, 9 5 who proclaimed his class action suit against managed care provider Aetna to be "the last line of defense for millions of
men, women, and children" 96 against an industry run amok. The
state of health care in America has truly reached a desperate stage
when patients need protection from the health care providers. How
could America's medical establishment, the undisputed world leader
in medical science and technology, 97 become so despised? The answer to that question begins with a brief look at where American
health care started and where it has been.
Until the middle of this century it was rare for an individual to
have health insurance.9 8 The rise of powerful labor organizations and
a post-war economic boom, however, convinced American CEOs in
93 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Court Weis Doctor's Bonus vs. Patients Care, WAsm Post,
Feb. 17, 2000, at Al (describing an example of tie negative effects of ph)sician incentives
to limit treatment costs). Cindy Herdrich won $35,000 from her health care provider after
it forced her to wait eight days before receiving a critical diagnostic test that would have

revealed her inflamed appendix. Ia. Herdrich's case eventually became the basis of a Su-

preme Court decision holding that mixed eligibility and treatment decisions by HMO physicians are not fiduciary acts under ERISA. S&e Pegram %.Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237
(2000); infra notes 203-11 and accompanying text.

94 See, ag., ANnERs, supranote 10, at 8-9. Anders relates the tragic story of littlejames
Adams who, as an infant, became very ill. The gravity of the boy's situation was not apparent to the HMO nurse whom the child's parents consulted over the telephone. Because
the nurse and an on-call doctor did not authorize emergency procedures, a delay occurred
inJames's treatment, resulting in the amputation of both his hands and both his feet. Se
it. at 1-13.

95
96
97

98

See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
Nocera, supra note 7, at 38.
See ANnrsts, supra note 10, at 22.
I. at 19-20.
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the 1950s that providing health care for their companies' employees
could serve as an affordable, important tool in labor relations.9 -1 Unfortunately, by the 1980s, what employers had initially considered affordable largess had become an intolerable drain on corporate
resources.' 0 0 The economic boom of the 1950s that inspired employer insurance inevitably slowed, but in the interim, employees had
come to consider employer-funded health care the employer's duty
rather than choice.' 0 1
Meanwhile, a trip to the doctor took on different meaning. During the 1960s and 1970s, health care became a very specialized and
expensive proposition. 0 2 What may have been a simple visit to the
doctor in 1950 came to involve, a generation later, an exhaustingly
thorough examination that left no stone unturned.1 0 3 Modem treatment often involved a team of specialists using the most advanced
(and expensive) diagnostic machines, ordering batteries of tests, and
04
prescribing the latest in wonder drugs.'
As the methods for patient treatment changed, so did doctors'
attitudes. Beginning in the 1960s, American medical schools encouraged their students to gravitate to the most narrow and difficult
specialties. 10 5 Doctors spent millions of employers' dollars not on curing or preventing disease, but in slowing down the effects of advanced
illnesses.' 0 6 Because doctors received payment for each test they ran
or for each drug they prescribed, the system encouraged doctors to
use their advanced training and resources liberally-often at great
07
cost to employers.
B.

The Rise of Managed Care

By the 1980s, health care expenses were responsible for an enormous amount of corporate resources, and the situation was growing
Id. at 20.
Id. at 20-25. Anders quotesJoseph Califano, a former Chrysler director: "Chrysler
opened its treasury door to doctors and hospitals ....
Chrysler increasingly insulated Its
employees from any sense of what health care cost.... This gave the doctors the power to
write their own checks on the Chrysler account." Id. at 20.
101 See id. at 22 ("Workers had begun to regard health coverage as an unending free
resource-an entitlement.").
102
See id. at 20-21.
99

100

103

See id.

See i. at 21.
See id.
106
See id.
107 See id. at 24-25. Anders relates one example of the peculiar effect that the opportunity for treatment can have on employees: "When Chrysler put in a generous mental-health
benefit, psychiatric treatment of its workers and their families jumped fivefold. There was
no sign that the car company had begun hiring workers who were more disturbed ....
104
105

Instead, the mere existence of the benefit was generating demand." Id. at 21.
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worse each year. 0 8 Nationwide, the cost of health care was increasing
at an annual rate greater than ten percent, and many corporations'
health plan costs were rising far faster than their overall corporate
sales.' 0 9 However, changing the system would not be easy. Employers
had created an ideal world for patients and doctors in which patients
received the best health care, their doctors received payment based
on the volume of services provided, and a deep-pocketed third party
footed the bills.1 ' 0 In addition, despite their financial incentive to
overtreat patients, doctors had the privilege of controlling the entire
system."' In essence, then, American corporations had created a system in which they could not win. Whether a doctor overtreated a patient for his own financial benefit or acted out of a sincere desire to
do everything possible for his patient, he had no incentives to limit
that treatment 1 1 2 It was apparent that employers had written a blank
check to the health care industry, and patients and doctors were taking full advantage of it.
The solution for corporations was "managed care."' 13 The HMO
exemplified this new system, which fundamentally altered the waIy patients received care and doctors provided it114 No longer would a
doctor receive payment for each test he ordered or for each drug he
prescribed; under managed care, a doctor would receive a flat fee to
cover all patient care-a system known as "capitation."' 15 If the doctor provided no services to a patient, he could keep the entire fee;
however, the cost of any treatment he provided would be deducted
from his fee." 6 This new strategy achieved exactly what corporations
needed: it aligned doctors' financial interests with those of employers
7
rather than with those of patients."
Managed care introduced other cost-control measures to the
health care industry. From a doctor's perspective, the most invasive
108
109
110

I. at 22.
I&
See d at 24-25.

111
See id. at 25.
112 See id; Kathy L Cerminara, The Class Action Suit as a MAehod ofPatietEmpowr.ent in
the Afanaged CareSetting, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 11-12 (1998).
113 ANDEP.s, supranote 10, at 25.
114 See i& at 25-26; MichAEL E. MluiovR, MISmANAGED Qma How ConroRmPTE
MEDiCiNEJEoPARDmES YOUR HEALTH 13 (1998). Managed care insurers "in effect hire doctors, hospitals, and other services to provide care to their subscribers, who pay the insurers

to use those services. This critical difference (as compared with fee-for-service health
plans] gives the insurance company direct control over those providing health care to subscribers." I&d
115 AND.Rs,supra note 10, at 26.
116 See id
117 IRt at 25-26; see MK Gaedeke Roland, Comment, Lookngfor a Pn'nee Among the Frog.:
Solutions to ERISA's PreemptiveEffect on Improving Health Care,47 Bury. L Rv 1487, 1523-25

(1999).
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was the use of "managed care reviewers" to review a doctor's method
of treatment. 118 These reviewers, usually an HMO's own employees
and sometimes not even doctors, check and second-guess the cost-effectiveness of a doctor's method of treatment. 1 19 For big-ticket items
such as imaging tests or lengthy hospital stays, HMOs require doctors
to gain prior approval. 120 If the treatment does not meet an HMO's
standards for value, the reviewer denies the treatment. 2 1 Under a
managed care system, doctors find themselves relinquishing much of
their professional autonomy.
In a managed care world, the patient and her doctor no longer
determined between themselves what was in the best interests of the
patient. Managed care introduced a new player into health care,
someone whose primary job centered not on advancing the patient's
health, but rather on the HMO's bottom line.' 22 Managed care trampled upon the sacred patient-doctor relationship, destroying doctors'
status as trusted confidants who are interested primarily in their patients' well-being.' 23 In a managed care setting, a doctor's interests

are conflicted. 124 Although his training and ethical duty tell him to
do all he can to treat a patient, his supervisor and even his paycheck
118 See ANDERS, supra note 10, at 87. These managed care reviewers function as overseers of the HMO's physicians and they "frequently relent if a doctor insists that good
medical judgment requires an exception to [established HMO procedures]." Id.
119 See id. at 87-88. As an example of the detail with which managed care reviewers
scrutinize doctors' decisions, Anders reports the experience of one southern California
doctor who attempted to prescribe a smaller-than-normal pill that his young patient could
more easily swallow. "A Utah-based HMO clerk pulled up the child's medical records and
declared during a phone review, '[The child] was able to swallow an even larger pill last
week.'" Id. at 87-88. According to the plaintiffs who filed a class action suit against HMO
Cigna Corporation, Cigna "analyzes the clinical practice patterns of individual physicians"
and identifies both "cost effective" physicians and physicians "who utilize more than the
optimal amount of health services." Cigna Class Action Complaint, supra note 6, 73(e).
Those doctors with "undesirable practice profiles . . . are [then] reminded that Cigna
contracts only with practitioners who provide 'appropriate utilization.'" Id.
120
See ANDERS, supra note 10, at 26, 78.
121
See id. at 86-87; Roland, supra note 117, at 1492. Under traditional fee-for-service
plans, an insurer often disputed whether it was required to pay for a patient's treatment,
but that dispute took place after the patient received the care. Id. In a managed care
world, the insurer may refuse payment for a service before a patient receives the service,
leading HMOs to refuse more treatment than under the earlier fee-for-service regime. Id,
122
See ANDERS, supra note 10, at 25-26.
123
See id. at 78; Cerminara, supra note 112, at 14-15. Cerminara writes:
Patients thus have watched the traditionally personal physician-patient relationship transform into a sterile interaction in which care might be denied
or might not be offered because of cost considerations.... Consumers of
health care services hear that the system today depends not on confidence,
trust and personal relationships, but on caveat emptor.
Id. (footnote omitted).
124
See ANDERS, supra note 10, at 79 (quotingJerome P. Kassirer, Managed Careand the
Morality of the Marketplace, 333 Nmv ENG. J. MED. 50 (1995)).
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urge him to provide nothing but the minimum amount of patient
care.
For the patient, managed care limits the freedom to see a doctor
of her choice. HMO members must choose a "primary care" physician from a list of preselected doctors affiliated with their particular
HMO.125 If a patient wants to see a specialist, she first needs to isit
her primary-care physician.' 2 6 This doctor, ever mindful of the accountant watching over his shoulder, then determines if more expertise is truly necessary. 12 7 If the doctor deems a specialist necessary, the

patient receives another list of names. This list does not necessarily
identify the doctors most skilled in treating certain illnesses, but instead names those specialists with whom the HMO has arranged con28
tracts for discounted services.'
Although the managed care system may raise the ire of patients
and doctors, it accomplished exactly what employers desired.12 9
HMOs made good on their promise to tame the sky rocketing costs of
health care.' 3 0 For many companies, HMOs cut double-digit health
care expenditures in half and left the companies with affordable
health plans.' 3 ' State and local governments also recognized the relief that managed care could offer from budget-breaking health expenditures, and soon, government employees across the nation found
themselves enrolled in HMOs.' 3 2 After the introduction of HMOs,
the American health care scene changed dramatically within only a
few years. By the late 1990s, estimates indicated that managed care, a
system of health insurance that covered less than one in ten Americans in the mid-1980s, 13 3 insured over eighty percent of working
13 4
Americans with health insurance.
125
126
127

See it.at 26, 76.
d. at 76.
See id.at 76, 78-79. The plaintiffs in the Cigna class action suit refer to a patient's

primarycare physician in a managed care context as a "gatekeeper." Cigna Class Action
Complaint, supra note 6, 59. This gatekeeper "provides the basic medical senices for the
[HMO] member, while coordinating any additional medical senices that might be
needed." Id/Among the responsibilities of the gatekeeper is ie determination of
"whether [an HMO] member should be referred to a specialist." Id.
See AND-Rs, supranote 10, at 80, 89.
See it.at 29.
130
See iULat 29-31 (reviewing the cost-cutting example of Allied Signal, which big companies across the nation emulated).
131
See i&.at 31; cf Roland, supra note 117, at 1497 (arguing that HMOs reduced employers' expenditures on health care not by decreasing the cost of medical senices, but by
decreasing the amount of care provided).
132 ANDERs, supra note 10, at 33.
133
Id.at 29.
134 Edith M. Kallas et al., Class Actions in the Healthcare Context, in HLTt CRE Lw
AND LrGATION 505, 510 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Oct. 14, 1999). availableat WL SE34
ALI-ABA 505.
128
129
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Managed care is the dominant means of health insurance in
America because it offers superior cost savings over any other type of
insurance. The cost-containment systems that made the success of
managed care possible, however, are precisely what has engendered
the American public's scorn of HMOs. l3 5 Outraged at what they per-

ceive as shortcomings in their health care, HMO members have filed
class action lawsuits against their providers claiming they were denied
necessary medical treatment because of the HMOs' focus on cutting
costs.

136

III
RECENT CLAss

A.

AcTiON LAWSUITS AGAINST HMOs

Background

The 1999 Thanksgiving holiday did not find the managed care
industry with much to celebrate. Earlier that week, five of the nation's
largest managed care providers became the targets of class action lawsuits. 137 The plaintiffs, members of the defendant HMOs, allege that

the HMOs misrepresented the coverage they provided and violated
certain duties owed to their members. 3 8 The Thanksgiving week lawsuits came on the heels of four similar lawsuits filed against HMOs.' -9
135
136
137

See AI, DERs, supra note 10, at 227-29.

See Cerminara, supra note 112, at 9-10.
Rubin & Weinstein, supra note 4. The Thanksgiving week lawsuits sought relief
from the following HMOs: PacifiCare Health Systems Inc., Foundation Health Systems
Inc., Cigna Healthcare, Prudential Health Care, and Humana Inc. Id. The five suits were
filed in the federal district court in Hattiesburg, Mississippi by a consortium of fourteen law
firms led by Richard Scruggs. Id.; Five More HMOs Face Class-Action Lawsuits, BESr's INS,
NEws, Nov. 24, 1999, available at 1999 WL 21819664.
138
See Five More HMOs Face Class-Action Lawsuits, supra note 137.
139
See Rubin & Weinstein, supra note 4. The same group of attorneys had initiated
similar lawsuits against Paciflare and Aetna. See Five MoreHMOs Face Class-Action Lawsuits,
supra note 137. The first of these HMO suits, filed on October 4, 1999, names Humana as
defendant and alleges that the health plan did not disclose the role that cost considerations played in making medical decisions. See Rebecca Lentz, See You in Court: HMOs Farea
Groundswellof Lawsuitsfrom Patients,MoD. PHYSIcIAN, Nov. 1, 1999, at 3, availableat 1999 WL
8747968. The health insurer, Aetna, found itself the subject of two lawsuits, each also filed
during the first week of October 1999. Id. The first, filed in federal district court in PhUadelphia, accuses Aetna of breaching a duty to its members by failing to disclose information about physician compensation. Id. The second Aetna suit, filed a day later in federal
district court in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, alleges mail fraud and extortion. Id. The group
of lawyers responsible for the Thanksgiving week lawsuits has since succeeded in consolidating the suits before a single federal judge in Miami. See Panel Sends 50 H.M 0. Suits to
OneJudg4 N.Y. TmEs, Oct. 25, 2000, at C9.
The cases were consolidated before Judge Moreno of the District Court for the Southern District of Florida and renamed In re Managed CareLitigation. See In re Managed Care
Litig., Nos. MDL 1334, 00-1334-MD, 2001 WL 660869, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 12, 2001). On
June 12, 2001, Judge Moreno partially dismissed the plaintiffs' claims but allowed their
attorneys to refile amended complaints. Id. at *23. In his order, Judge Moreno explained
that the plaintiffs did not provide enough examples of the documents and advertisements
they claim misled them, thus failing to plead their RICO claims with sufficient specificity.
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In each lawsuit, the plaintiffs allege that their H Os had
breached a duty owed to their members by failing to disclose that the
HMOs incentivized doctors to limit treatment in order to keep costs

down. 140 Without full disclosure, the plaintiffs allege, they "cannot
make informed choices about which plans to enroll in or whether to
seek care outside of a plan."' 4 1 The plaintiffs complain that these
cost-reduction efforts interfered with their doctor-patient relationship
1 42
and discouraged doctors from providing necessary medical care.
According to the plaintiffs, this "heavy-handed extortionate conduct" 145 constitutes a violation of the civil Racketeer Influenced and
4 4 and the Employee Retirement
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)1
Income Security Act (ERISA).145 The plaintiffs seek restitution, punitive damages, and an injunction to prevent HMOs from continuing to
interfere with doctors' medical judgment. 4 6
Id at *13. Judge Moreno also dismissed the plaintiffs' ERISA claims because the plaintiffs
failed to show that they had exhausted their administrative remedies. Id. at 019. The
judge, however, invited the plaintiffs to replead showing exhaustion. IL
Despite dismissing most of the plaintiffs' claims, thejudge appeared more receptive to
the underlying theories of recovery than did the Third Circuit when it heard a similar
lawsuit involving the insurer Aetna. See id. at *4-*5 (criticizing Maio v. Aetna Inc., 221 F.3d
472 (3d Cir. 2000)); infra notes 196-99 and accompanying text. In fact, Judge Moreno
wrote that the Maio court's reasoning should "not be adopted," explaining that health plan
enrollees possess more than a mere contractual interest in their health plan. Managed
Care,2001 WL 660869, at *4-*5. Judge Moreno suggested that enrollees can recover under
RICO if they were fraudulently induced to purchase their health insurance, and that recovery would be possible even if the health care provider never breached its contracts with its
enrollees. Id140 Cigna Class Action Complaint, supra note 6,
16; Fe Afore HMOs Face Class.Aetion
Lawsuits, supra note 137.
141 SeeAlissaJ. Rubin & Henry Weinstein, As Smoe Cleans, LartlersTahe On Health Insurers, LA TBErs, Oct. 9, 1999, at Al.
142 See Cigna Class Action Complaint, supra note 6, 1 10; Tt,e Afore HMOs Face ClassAction Lawsuits, supra note 137.
143 See Cigna Class Action Complaint, supra note 6, 13.
144 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994 & Supp. Ar 1998); see Cigna Class Action Complaint,
supra note 6, 1.
145 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (1994 & Supp. RV 1998); see Cigna Class Action Complaint, supra
note 6, 1; Milo Geyelin, LawurerSeeks Early HAMO Settlement, Wu. Sr.J. Ea., Nov. 25, 1999,
at 11, available at 1999 WL-WSJE 27644946.
146 See Cigna Class Action Complaint, supranote 6, 11; Geyelin, supra note 145. The
Cigna class action complaint is typical of the other HMO suits that Richard Scruggs's team
of attorneys filed Thanksgiving week of 1999 and is very similar to the lawsuit that his team
filed against Aetna six weeks earlier. Compare Cigna Class Action Complaint, supra note 6,
with Amended Class Action Complaint, O'Neil v. Aetna, Inc., No. 2:99 CV 284 (S.D. Miss.
filed Nov. 8, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Aetna Class Action Complaint].
Some of the more notable allegations raised in the Cigna suit include the folloing: Cigna
is engaged in a nationwide fraudulent scheme aimed at inducing the plaintiff class to enroll in Cigna's HMO plans. Cigna Class Action Complaint, supra note 6, 11 4, 7. The
scheme is fraudulent because it includes misleading and deceptive misrepresentations and
omissions. Id. 7. Specifically, Cigna states that it is committed to maintaining and improving the quality of health care it provides for its members, but in actuality, Cigna pursues a series of undisclosed policies aimed at reducing the quality and amount of medical
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B. Theories of Recovery
RICO is a complex statute initially designed to combat organized
crime. 147 It is difficult to state a valid RICO claim, and a plaintiff in a

civil suit needs to prove that a defendant violated two or more criminal laws, such as mail fraud, wire fraud, bribery, or extortion.1 48 The
plaintiffs in the HMO suits claim that the bonuses which HMOs paid
to doctors and claims reviewers who denied expensive treatments,
along with the HMOs' use of interstate communications to advertise
49
their services, satisfy RICO's statutory elements.'

RICO was opened as a possible avenue of recovery for aggrieved
HMO members after the Supreme Court's decision in Humana Inc. v.
Forsyth.150 This 1999 case, originating in Nevada, involved beneficiaries of group health insurance policies issued by Humana.'," The
beneficiaries learned that Humana had negotiated discounted contracts with the hospitals providing treatment without lowering the
beneficiaries' premiums accordingly. 15 2 The plaintiffs sued Humana
15 3
under the federal RICO statute.
At issue in the lower courts was whether the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, passed in 1945 by Congress to protect states' efforts in regulating
insurance, 5 4 barred the plaintiffs in Forsyth from bringing their insurance suit under RICO.' 5 5 The case eventually reached the Supreme
services provided in a profit-maximization effort. See id.
7, 10. The representations
Cigna made are more than mere "puffing" because they are material to consumer decision
making. See id. 7. The result of these policies is to impose pecuniary damages on tie
member, to deprive the member of health care services, and to interfere in the relationship between the member and his doctor. See id. 9 7, 10. In addition, Cigna fails to
disclose to its members that its doctors are not independent medical practitioners but instead are pawns in the Cigna financial incentive and disincentive scheme, which aims to
limit practitioners' treatment of patients. See id.
17, 64. Cigna's campaign of misrepresentation includes "trick, deceit, chicanery and rapacious overreaching." Id. 7. The undisclosed internal policies that Cigna pursued constitute several wrongful acts. See id. 54.
Specifically, Cigna violated the RICO statute by engaging in extortionate conduct toward
its own physicians, by fraudulently interfering with the patient-physician fiduciary relationship, and by using mail and ire to further its fraudulent scheme. See id. 1 14, 54.
147
SeeJanan Hanna, Five HMOs FaceLawsuits ChargingSubparCare, Ci-. Tmi., Nov. 25,
1999, at 1.
148
See id.
149
See Cigna Class Action Complaint, supra note 6, 9 9, 14, 118.
150 525 U.S. 299 (1999); seeTom Abate, State's HMOs Are FacingLegalFight, S.F. CHRoN.,
Oct. 21, 1999, at C1.
151 See Forsyth, 525 U.S. at 303-04.
152 See id.
153
See id. at 304. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Humana violated RICO
"through a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of mail, wire, radio, and television
fraud." Id.
154 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994); 525 U.S. at 306.
155 525 U.S. at 308. The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides, in relevant part: "No Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any
State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance ... unless such Act specifically
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Court, where Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not cede the entire field
56
of insurance regulation to the states.'
Justice Ginsburg wrote that federal law may apply so long as it
"does not directly conflict with state regulation, and... [its application] would not frustrate any declared state policy or interfere with a
State's administrative regime." 157 Applying this rationale, the Court
concluded that the RICO suit did not impair Nevada insurance laws
nor frustrate Nevada policy simply because RICO provided stiffer penalties for insurance fraud. 15 8 In fact, the Court concluded that RICO
"appears to complement Nevada's statutory and common-law claims
for relief" 5 9 and "advances the State's interest in combating insurance fraud." 160 Therefore, the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar
the plaintiffs from suing Humana under the federal RICO statute.' 6'
As a second ground of recovery, plaintiffs in the HMO lawsuits
16 2
cite the Employee Retirement Investment Security Act (ERISA).
ERISA is a federal statute regulating the relationship between IMOs
and employees who receive their medical coverage through their employer.' 6 3 Traditionally, ERISA served as a shield for insurers because
it barred members of employer-sponsored health plans from suing
their health care provider'16 4 Plaintiffs' attorneys, however, found a
way around ERISA. by alleging a breach of fiduciary duty, they are
able to bring suits against HMOs on behalf of employees.16 7 In these
cases, plaintiffs claim that HMOs breach their obligation to put the
relates to the business of insurance .

. .. "

15 U.S.C.

§ 1012(b)

(1994).

Ser Forsyth v.

Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1479 (9th Cir. 1997), affd, 525 US. 299 (1999).
156 525 U.S. at 308.
157
Id. at 310.
158

Id. at 303, 311, 314.

159

I. at 313.
Id. at 314.

160
161

Id. See generally Eric Beal, Note, It's Better to Have Twzdve AMontrs Chasing You than

One Gori//a. Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, the McCarran-FergusonAct, RICO, and Deternnce, 5
CoNN. INs. UJ. 751 (1999) (discussing how the availability of RICO actions deters insurers
from defrauding policyholders).
162
29 U.S.C. § 1054 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see, eg., Collin Levey, Editorial, T/hre
Ways to ShakeDown an HMO, WAL ST.J.,Jan. 3, 2000, atA19 (explaining that trial lavyers
utilized ERISA's fiduciary relationship concept in order to attack HMOs' cost-cutting behaviors as contrary to the best interests of their members).
163
Roland, supra note 117, at 1489-90; Levey, supranote 162. Congress passed ERISA
in 1974 as a means of protecting employees' pensions. See Roland, supra note 117, at 1489.
As part of its goal to create a national standard, Congress included in ERISA a clause that
preempted states from regulating employer pension plans. See id. at 14994. The broad
preemption language, however, also precluded states from regulating health benefits that
employees receive from their employers. See id. at 1494-95. As a result, employees essentially lost their state law causes of action against health insurers covered under ERISA and
retained only the partial remedies that federal courts provide. &e id. at 1498, 1499-1501.
164 See Levey, supra note 162.
165

Id.
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patients' needs first by financially incentivizing doctors to limit the
medical treatment they provide.' 66 Thus, after Forsyth and plaintiffs'
attorneys' circumvention of the ERISA shield, the stage was set for
plaintiffs to initiate class action lawsuits against the managed care industry. All that was needed were the right players.
C.

Tactics

The settlement between tobacco companies and the state attorneys general of less than a year earlier conveniently provided a company of experienced and well-financed lawyers to lead the HMO class
action lawsuits. In fact, roughly half the attorneys in the loosely assembled network of plaintiffs' lawyers who brought the lawsuits against
the managed care industry are veterans of the tobacco litigation,.1 7
The group's leader is Richard Scruggs, 168 the attorney who played a
pivotal role in the tobacco suits. His team, emboldened by its successes against the tobacco corporations and fueled by the staggering
attorneys fees it collected, seeks to repeat its success in the health care
arena. The presence of these attorneys, and the legal tactics they
bring, make the HMO suits a derivative of the successful tobacco settiement reached in the fall of 1998.
Although the suits against HMOs are based on RICO grounds,
Scruggs and his group of lawyers are borrowing at least two of the
techniques they used to force tobacco companies to the bargaining
table: pressure from Congress and pressure from Wall Street.
1. PoliticalAction
Before the first HMO lawsuit was filed in October 1999, Congress
was well aware of the criticism that HMOs faced for their cost-reduction policies.' 69 The House considered, and passed, a patients' rights
bill that would have expanded an HMO member's ability to sue an
HMO. 7 0 The Senate passed its own version of the bill, but the con166

Id.; see supra note 140 and accompanying text.

167
168

See Plaintiffs' Lawyers Step Up PressureAgainst HMOs, supra note 79.
Id.

169 SeeJack Torry, House Passes Patient Rights, PrrTSBURGH POST-GAzM-rr, Oct. 8, 1999,
at Al, available at 1999 WL 25693808.
170 See Milo Geyelin, Lawyer Seeks Supportfor Settlement with HMOs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22,

1999, at B2; Torry, supra note 169. One of the authors of the Patients' Bill of Rights Act in
the House, although still supporting increased liability for insurers, criticized the recent
class action lawsuits filed against the managed care industry and sought to amend the
patients' rights bill to prohibit class action lawsuits against HMOs. See Norwood Seeks Amend-

ment BarringHMO Class-Action Suits, BTsr's INS. NEws, Jan. 12, 2000, availableat 2000 WL
4084395.
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gressional term ended without resolution of how far the right to sue
171
should extend.
Scruggs's team of lawyers has met with lawmakers on Capitol Hill
in an attempt to lay the groundwork for a global settlement akin to
the agreement Congress nearly reached with the tobacco companies
in 1997.172 Building on the action already taken in Congress, Scruggs

proposes a bill that would cap the annual liability exposure HMOs
would face in return for an end to HMOs' placing limitations on patient care.1 73 However, unlike the case of tobacco lawsuits, in which
various liability theories were well tested over decades, many legal
questions regarding HMO liability remain outstanding. At this point
most HMOs seem willing to test their defenses in court before relinquishing perhaps billions of dollars in a settlement. In addition, public criticism of HMOs has yet to reach the level of vitriolic fury
projected toward the tobacco companies in the months before that
industry settled.

2. FinancialPressure
The financial markets provide a source of leverage that may
prove even more powerful than politics. In addition to his efforts on
Capitol Hill, Scruggs has visited Wall Street to "educate" analysts there
about the problems with HMOs and just how vulnerable his lawsuits
171 See A Survey of the Voting Record of the 106th Congress N.Y. Tv-m, Dec. 17,2000, at48.
Technically, a patient already had the right to sue her HMO for allegedly bad care, but
could recover only the cost of the denied treatment. Tony, supra note 169. Patients complained that without a cause of action for damages, their rights were severely limited, and it
was this limitation that Congress sought to change ith its patients' rights bill. Id.
In June of 2001, following a change of party control in the Senate, the Democrats
succeeded in passing their version of a patients' bill of rights. See Helen Demar & Amy
Goldstein, Senate Passes Patients'Rights Bil WASH. Posr, June 30, 2001, at Al (discussing
passage of the Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001)). The Senate
bill includes three key rights: it guarantees enrollees access to basic services, provides for
independent review of disputed decisions, and gives patients the right to sue their insurer
in state as well as federal court. See S. 1052; David Rogers, Denocras Hope Senate BridgeBuilding Wins GOP Patients-RightsVotes in Hous4 WAU Sr. J.,July 2, 2001, at A3. President
Bush has threatened to veto the legislation, arguing that expanding an individual's ability
to sue in state court would result in higher insurance costs and ultimately greater numbers
of uninsured people. See Dewar & Goldstein, supra.
Rather than await federal action, several states have already enacted legislation to improve patient care. See Kallas et al., supra note 134, at 512 (describing managed care liability laws in Texas and California); Roland, supranote 117, at 1515-16 (describing legislation
in Georgia, NewYork, and Maine designed to improve patient care provided by managed
care organizations).
172
See eyelin, supra note 170. This unprecedented "global tobacco agreement"
would have capped annual damages the tobacco companies could be forced to pay. Id.
The bill, however, failed to gain a consensus in Congress and ultimately collapsed, leaving
the states to arrange the less ambitious settlement of November 1998. d.
173

Id
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have made investors' money. 174 The effect of such "education" was
apparent in late September 1999 when, spooked by the first wave of
HMO lawsuits, nervous investors in a single day sold off more than $12
billion in shares of the targeted HMOs. 175 For some HMOs, the selloff wiped out between ten and twenty percent of their market
76
value.,
Shareholder nervousness stems from the enormous punitive-damage verdicts that juries have recently awarded plaintiffs in corporate
tort actions, 177 some of which were large enough to threaten businesses with bankruptcy. 178 Investors worry even more now that plaintiffs' lawyers, who traditionally work alone, have pooled their
resources and are now able to fund extensive and protracted litigation. 179 The fear that a company could be in court for years, only to
lose a decision that may result in bankruptcy, is more than enough to
scare away risk-averse investors. 18 0 Attorneys successfully used this
strategy of pressuring corporate CEOs with investors' concerns in the
tobacco lawsuits, where cigarette makers eventually paid enormous
settlements to end lawsuits despite their string of courtroom victories.' 1' In anticipation of that global settlement agreement, the market rewarded the cigarette companies by boosting their stock
prices. 8 2 Scruggs and his legal team hope the same formula will work
against HMOs.
D.

A Critique of the Legal Merits

As in the tobacco litigation, the recovery theories that plaintiffs
have proposed in the HMO lawsuits are both novel and of questionable legal merit. Plaintiffs in the health care actions have advanced two
primary grounds for recovery: the federal RICO and ERISA
statutes. 183

174
See id.; David Segal, Tag-Team Lawyers Make Businesses Blink, WASH. PosT, Nov. 12,
1999, at Al (reporting criticism of HMO plaintiffs' attorneys for "tag team" lawyering and
using the financial market to pressure opponents into early settlements).
175 See Segal, supranote 174.

176

Se id.

177

Se id.

178

See id&

179
180

See id.

See id.
181 See id
182 See Milo Geyelin, States Agree to $206 Billion Tobacco Dea4 WAL. ST. J., Nov. 23, 1998,
at B13.
183
See, eg., Cigna Class Action Complaint, supra note 6, 1; Aetna Class Action Complaint, supra note 146, 1; supra Part 1II.B.
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RICO-Based Recovery. Maio v. Aetna

Of the class action lawsuits alleging RICO violations by managed
care organizations, the first to receive a judge's attention was Maio v.
Aetna Inc.184 That suit named Aetna, a managed care provider, as defendant. 185 The district court judge, however, dismissed the suit in
late September 1999, concluding that "[a] vague allegation that 'quality of care' may suffer in the future is too hypothetical an injury to
18 6
confer standing upon plaintiffs."
The lawsuits filed Thanksgiving week of 1999 alleged essentially
the same RICO violations as Maio.'8 7 In each case, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the victims of fraud because they were led to
believe that their HMO put its members' medical needs first when, in
actuality, the HMO sought to restrict the treatment it provided in order to boost profits. 185 The result of this failure to disclose, according
to the plaintiffs, is that the health insurance that the plaintiffs purchased is worth less than what they paid for it.ts9 As the judge in Maio
pointed out, however, the plaintiffs did not list a single specific injury
that resulted from any denial of treatment 9 0 The type of harm alleged is merely speculative, and, as the judge suggested, if plaintiffs
were indeed denied necessary medical care in the future, the HMOs

themselves would not be the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' harm;
rather, the attending physician would be to blame.191
In addition to the absence of an injury in fact, the judge in Maio

found other problems with a suit based on RICO grounds. The judge
questioned whether Aetna truly committed any fraud, 192 determining
that Aetna's quality-of-care promises were merely "puffery," and that
"the complained-of cost containment provisions are disdosed to pro184 No. CIV. A. 99-1969, 1999 WL 800315 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1999), affd, 221 F.3d 472
(3d Cir. 2000). The gravamen of the plaintiffs' complaint vias that Aetna fraudulently
induced them to enroll in Aetna's HMO plan. Id. at *1. The plaintiffs alleged that
whereas Aetna represented that it was primarily concerned with providing the highest quality of care for the plaintiffs, Aetna was primarily interested in maximizing profits and containing costs. I.
185 Id. at *1.
186 Id. at *2.
187 See, e-g., Cigna Class Action Complaint, supra note 6, 1 118; Aetna Class Action
Complaint, supra note 146, 177; supra note 146 and accompan)ing text.
188 See, eg., Maio, 1999 WL 800315, at *1; Cigna Class Action Complaint, supra note 6,
1 7, 9, 10; Aetna Class Action Complaint, supra note 146, 1 7, 9, 10.
189 See, eg., Maio, 1999 WiL 800315, at *1; Cigna Class Action Complaint, supra note 6,
[ 13; Aetna Class Action Complaint, supra note 146, 1 20.
190 See Maio, 1999 WL 800315, at *2. The court noted that the plaintiffs emxplicitly disclaimed "any injury due to the denial of benefits, reduction of benefits, inferior care, malpractice, negligence and breach of contract-in short,... any injury that has the potential
to decrease the value of defendants' plans. The HMOs simply cannot be 'worth less' unless
something plaintiffs were promised was denied them." Id.

191
192

See id.

Id.
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spective members." 95 Most notably, the judge concluded that the
corporate relationship between an insurer and its subsidiary HMO, or

between an HMO and the doctors with which it contracts, do not constitute the type of "enterprise" that the RICO statute intends to target.' 9 4 As a final note, the judge emphasized that "plaintiffs' . . .
dissatisfaction with... HMOs in general... is more appropriately
directed to the legislatures and regulatory bodies of the several
states"1 95
In August 2000, the Third Circuit affirmed the Maio decision,
stating that the plaintiffs could not prove any "tangible economic
harm compensable under RICO."' 9 6 Like the district court, the Third
Circuit focused on the speculative nature of the plaintiffs' claims,
describing them as "conclusory" as the alleged harm might occur "in
some undefined way at some later point in the future."19 7 The court
also determined that the plaintiffs' fundamental argument, that the
HMO's system of rationing care rendered their health insurance inferior, was undermined by the Supreme Court's decision in Pegram v.
Herdrich.'98 There, the Court concluded that it was not the place of
the federal judiciary to determine the legal validity of an HMO's underlying structure. 99
The Maio dismissal was not encouraging news for supporters of
the remaining class action lawsuits that allege similar RICO violations
against other HMOs. However, before the courts can reach the merits
of these remaining class actions, the plaintiffs in those suits will need
to pass an important hurdle: they must convince a judge that there is
one overriding issue among them that warrants treating them as a single class. 20 0 Achieving class certification will not be easy. The five
193
194

Id.
Id

195 AL But see Kallas et al., supra note 134, at 520-21 (arguing that class actions are an
appropriate vehicle to resolve health care disputes because: (1) the small amount of financial harm that most enrollees suffer is minimal, making an individual action impractical,
(2) under a managed care regime, health care issues are systemic, making it difficult for an
aggrieved patient to receive better care simply by changing doctors; and (3) managed care
providers market their services nationwide with few variations, producing widespread and
similar harm); cf Cerminara, supranote 112, at 44-46, 58 (concluding that beneficiaries of
managed care organizations are unlikely to achieve individual empowerment from class
action lawsuits, but should continue to bring these suits in order to spotlight health care
issues and spur government regulatory agencies into action).
196 Mao v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 488 (3d Cir. 2000).
197 Id. at 494.
198 530 U.S. 211 (2000); Maio, 221 F.3d at 496-97; see also discussion infra Part III.D.3
(discussing plaintiffs' attempts to overcome the hurdle posed by Herdrich).
199 530 U.S. at 232-34.
200 The plaintiffs in the Cigna and Aetna class actions claim that their suits are appropriate for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires, in relevant part, that
"questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members." FED. R Civ. P. 23(b)(3); Cigna Class Action
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HMOs named in the Thanksgiving week lawsuits include over thirtytwo million members,2 01 and defense lawyers will surely argue that
there are at least some issues among such a large class that are unique
to certain individuals. One possible source of difficulty will be the
differing coverage levels among most of the thirty-two million HMO
members, a result of the varied plans that their employers chose to
20 2
negotiate with the HMOs.

2.

ERISA-Based Recovery

Initially, the ERISA avenue of recovery appeared more promising
than that of RICO. In Herdrich v. Pegram,2 03 the Seventh Circuit endorsed an ERISA-based suit.2 0 4 Herdrich involved a woman who
claimed that her HMO, in an effort to save money, delayed perform-

ing diagnostic tests that would have revealed an inflamed appendix,
which later ruptured. 0 5 According to the plaintiff, the delay resulted
2 06
in an infection and the need for emergency surgery.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case and, in June
2000, reversed the Seventh Circuit.2 0 7 The Court concluded that an
HMO does not breach a fiduciary duty under ERISA by giving its doctors financial incentives to ration medical care.2 0 3 The Court explained that when doctors administer medical care, they are making
"mixed" eligibility and treatment decisions that are not fiduciary deci-

Complaint, supra note 6, 3; Aetna Class Action Complaint, supra note 146, 3; see also
Hanna, supra note 147 ("'This litigation has a great number of barriers in front of it, the
most significant of which is securing class certification.'" (quotingJohn Coffee, professor
of law at Columbia University)).
201
See Rubin & Weinstein, supra note 4.
202
Id.; see also Matthew C. Browndorf, Note, Castano v. American Tobacco Co.: Joe
Camel and the Afarlboro -ManTake On Class Adions, 7 ImVzEaPJ. PuB. L 87, 99 (1997) ("At
the time of enactment of [Rule 23 permitting class actions], the theory of 'mass tort litigation ...did not exist.' The only comparable theory was the single-event accident, and the
Advisory Committee's Notes explicidtly state that '[a) "mass accident" ... is ordinarily not
appropriate for a class action.'" (quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co.. 84 F.3d 734, 746
n.23 (5th Cir. 1996); FED.R. Cmy. P. 23(b) (2) advisory committee note to the 1966 amendments) (footnotes omitted)). Courts have often denied class certification because they
found that "mass torts have individual and significant issues that predominate over the
common issues." Id. at 98-99; see also supra note 139.
203
154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
204 See id at 373. The court held that
incentives can rise to the level of a breach where, as pleaded here, the fiduciary trust between plan participants and plan fiduciaries no longer exists
(i.e., where physicians delay providing necessary treatment to, or wthhold

administering proper care to, plan beneficiaries for the sole purpose of increasing their bonuses).
I&
205

206
207
208

Id- at 365-66.
See id.
See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
Id. at 227.
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sions under ERISA. 2 09 The Court reasoned that an opposite result
would eliminate the for-profit HMO, a result contrary to Congress's
expressed intent as manifested in its extensive legislation promoting
HMO formation. 2 10 Furthermore, the Court explained that the larger
issue-the wisdom of a medical system based on care rationing-is a
complex, fact-intensive issue involving social judgments better left to
21
Congress. '
3.

Borrowing a Strategy from the Tobacco Litigation

It would appear that in the wake of Herdrichand Maio, plaintiffs in

HMO lawsuits will find it difficult to make out a cause of action under
either RICO or ERISA. However, the fact that RICO allows for trebledamage awards 21 2 lends considerable strength to the plaintiffs' suits by
exposing HMOs to tremendous potential liability. Plaintiffs may anticipate that defendant HMOs, facing the possibility of paying damage
awards to millions of members, will respond to the pressure by seeking a settlement. In fact, the same strategy worked in the Medicaid
reimbursement suits against the major tobacco companies in 1998. In
those cases, the defendants settled their cases against the state attorneys general largely to avoid bankruptcy, which an adverse judgment
might have produced. 21 3 Cigarette makers settled despite the novelty
and untested nature of the legal theories with which plaintiffs
threatened them. The managed care industry finds itself on the receiving end of similarly unique and unproven theories of liability.
The pressure on HMOs has been steadily increasing, as it previously had for the tobacco companies in the months leading to the
1998 settlement. Indeed, despite the legal hurdles created by the Herdrich and Maio decisions, the Connecticut Attorney General recently
launched a class action lawsuit against several HMOs. 21 4 In its lawsuit,
Id. at 229-31.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 221-22.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
See Amanda Spake & Jennifer Couzin, In the Air That They Breathe, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Dec. 20, 1999, at 54, 56; supra Part I.C.1. Just as plaintiffs' lawyers suing
tobacco companies relied upon Jeffrey Wigand, the whistleblowing insider at Brown & Williamson tobacco company, to expose many of that industry's dark secrets, see Bryant, supra
note 76, at 50, the plaintiffs in the HMO suits rely on expert witnesses such as Dr. iUnda
Peeno, a physician and former claims reviewer for Humana who left the managed care
industry after becoming disillusioned by the industry's policy of balancing medical treatment with cost effectiveness. See Philip Connors, FormerInsiderHelps in Suits Against HAlOs,
WALL ST.J., Nov. 26, 1999, at B1. Peeno has since testified as an expert witness on some of
the managed care industry's more questionable practices in two suits initiated by members
of HMOs. See id. The two suits resulted in multimillion dollar damage awards. Id.
214 See Plan Liability: Connecticut Attorney GeneralFiles Suit Against State's LargestManaged
CareFirms,Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA), at D-10 (Sept. 11, 2000) (discussing Connecticut
v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 3:00CV1716 (D. Conn. filed Sept. 7, 2000)),
209
210
211
212
213
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the state alleges that several HMOs used arbitrary guidelines to deny
coverage, blocked access to prescription drugs, and frustrated beneficiaries' attempts to file claims.2 1 5 To avoid the ramifications of the
Herd ich decision, Connecticut focused its complaint on perceived inadequacies in the HMOs' disclosure of their rationing schemes.2- 6
Although attorneys employed novel and untested legal theories
against tobacco companies, several distinctions make their use harder
to justify in the case of HMOs. Although tobacco companies sold a
legal product, information has come to light in recent years revealing
that the industry systematically deceived its customers.2 1 7 Tobacco
manufacturers concealed the true dangers of cigarettes from the pub218
lic and even manipulated the addictiveness of their product.
HMOs, on the other hand, market a product that helps rather than
hurts its consumers. Granted, HMOs seek to achieve a profit, but by
working to keep health care affordable they also serve a public purpose-a difficult claim for cigarette companies to make.
The managed care industry replaced an ailing health care regime

that was proving financially unsustainable.21 9 Because the managed
care industry evolved as a market response, at least one commentator
suggests that it should be left to the market to resolve any problems
with HMOs. 220 HMOs cover a majority of people today because they
represent a more attractive alternative to the former system of health
care that provided unlimited access, but at a prohibitive cost.22 If
consumers decide that the pendulum has swung too far toward sacrificing medical care for affordability, then the marketplace should be
allowed to supply its own solution. 22 The most desirable result may
be a health care system that provides more care than an HMO, yet at a
lower cost than the fee-for-service system that dominated a decade
ago.
available at WL 9/11/2000 HCD dZO; Andrew Julien, State Files Suit Against Four HMOs,
H.ARino CouRAr, Sept. 8, 2000, at Al (same), available at 2000 WL 23019296; Barbara
Martinez, ConnecticutAtlorney General ailes
Suit Against FourHMOs over CareIssue, W.L ST.
J., Sept. 8, 2000, at B6 (same).

The Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shidd suit followed a similar class action suit filed by the
state of Connecticut on behalf of beneficiaries of a health plan. The district court, how-

ever, dismissed this first suit as the state lacked standing to sue under ERISA. Se Connecticut v. Physicians Health Servs. of Conn., 103 F. Supp. 2d 495, 511 (D. Conn. 2000).

215
See PlanLiability: ConnecticutAttorney General Males Suit Against State's Largest Managed
Care Fzrms, supra note 214; Julien, supra note 214.
216
SeeJulien, supra note 214.
217 Player, supra note 29, at 324.
218 Id at 325-26.
219 See supraPart H.B.
220
SeeJ.D. Kleinke, Editorial, HMOs: The Law and Fonomic., BvuRo.i's, Dec. 13, 1999,
at 70.

221

See i&

222

See id.
("Litigation to take the teeth out of the HMOs 1ill distort and delay the

natural evolution of a U.S. health-care marketplace.").
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If HMO lawsuits were assessed solely on their legal merits, it is
likely that they would be rejected and the marketplace allowed to produce a solution. Granted, most managed care litigation is in its early
stages, butjudicial action to date confirms the weakness of these suits'
legal arguments. Unfortunately, extrajudicial tactics 223 available to
plaintiffs and their attorneys to use against HMOs may bring the litigation to a premature end, denying courts the opportunity to scrutinize
the plaintiffs' recovery theories. Using economic and political pressure to short-circuit the legal process would be regrettable because
these tactics are likely to result not in rational solutions to health care
issues, but rather in the extraction of financial concessions from a defeated opponent.
E.

The Wisdom of Dismantling the Managed Care System

Using court action as leverage to extract policy concessions from
an industry constitutes ad hoc legislation. Initially, in the tobacco litigation, the state attorneys general hoped to induce the tobacco companies to agree to broad policy goals, including drastic cuts in
cigarette marketing and consent to federal nicotine regulation, in addition to reimbursement of the states' tobacco-related Medicaid expenses.2 24 Ultimately, states only obtained pecuniary damages, the
2 25
goal that litigation is most suited to provide.
The present status of the HMO lawsuits is similar to the early
stages of the tobacco litigation; the plaintiffs want compensation for
perceived injuries, as well as fundamental change from an industry
that affects most Americans. 226 The plaintiffs' means of attaining
these goals, however, is questionable. If the plaintiffs succeed in their
class action lawsuits, a likely result will be higher premiums for HMO
members as managed care entities pass the cost of any adverse judgment or settlement on to their customers. 227 Moreover, if a plaintiff
victory results in a general condemnation of the managed care concept, a dismantling of HMOs' cost-containment mechanisms could result. Without the ability to hold costs down, health care will revert to
the unaffordable and wasteful fee-for-service regime of a decade ago.
The risks of restoring a financially unsustainable health care system
are obvious: a decline in the amount and quality of medical services
available to many Americans. In this light, a courtroom victory for the
class action plaintiffs seems shortsighted and hollow.
223

See supraPart III.C.

224
225
226

See infra note 329 and accompanying text.
See infra note 334 and accompanying text.
See Cerminara, supra note 112, at 48-50.

227

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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IV
Cij4ss

A.

ACnON LAWsurrs Ao Ansr OTHER INDUSTRIES FOLLOWING THE
TOBACCO LITIGATION-A CRITIQUE

Class Action Lawsuits Against the Paint Industry

Encouraged by the huge settlement paid by the tobacco industry,
state officials and plaintiffs' lawyers are searching for another industry
to target along with HMOs, the paint industry now finds itself in their
crosshairs. 228 The legal theory behind most of the paint industry suits

is that paint makers sold lead-based paint even after discovering a link
between lead and illness. 2 29 One suit in particular borrowed a page
directly from the tobacco litigation playbook when the Rhode Island
Attorney General filed suit in state court against eight paint manufacturers and the industry's trade association. 23 0 The Attorney General
has even gone so far as to hire a plaintiffs' law firm that is a veteran of
the tobacco settlement. 23 ' Rhode Island is seeking compensatory
damages for its lead poisoning-related costs. 232 Over the years, Rhode

Island has spent millions of dollars on the treatment and special education needs of children with lead poisoning, as well as millions more
to remove lead paint from contaminated schools, hospitals, and pub233
lic housing.
1.

Liability Issues in the Lead Paint Cases

Lead poisoning is a serious medical condition; elevated levels of
lead in the bloodstream can damage the brain, kidneys, and nervous
system of children. 234 The resulting mental and physical damage
often leads to learning disabilities, attention deficit disorder, and, ac228 See Cupp, supranote 14 (discussing how the tobacco settlement between the state
attorneys general and cigarette companies encouraged other government entities to bring
suits against the paint and firearms industries).
229 See Gillian Flynn, R.L Sues Lead PaintMalers, AP ONuNu, Oct. 13, 1999, available at
1999 WL 28127764.
230 See Rhode Island First State to Sue Makers of Lead Paint, NAxtoN's HFrni, Dec.
1999-Jan. 2000, at 10, available at 1999 WL 23531373.
231 Pendell, supra note 16 (criticizing the state of Rhode Island for bringing suit
against paint makers when the industry acted responsibly in dealing uith the danger of
lead paint).

232

See Rhode Island First State to Sue Makers of Lead Paint, .supranote 230.
See Carol Donovan et al., Editorial, It's Time to Collet for Damages Wrought 4 Lead
Paint...,BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 22, 1999, atA13; Rhode Island FirstState to Sue Mahers of Lead
Paint,supra note 230. On April 2, 2001, a Rhode Island court held that the state attorney
general could pursue his case against paint manufacturers and their trade association-but
only those common law tort claims alleging harm caused by lead in public buildings. State
v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226, 2001 WL 345830, at *13 (RI. Super. Ct Apr. 2, 2001).
The judge concluded that the Attorney General could not prosecute tort claims on behalf
of individual citizens. Id. at *12.
234 Donovan et al., supra note 233.
233
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cording to some researchers, increased criminal behavior.2 3 Although the problem was much worse before the federal government
banned lead-based paints in 1978,236 millions of children who live in
older homes continue to suffer from lead poisoning. 23 7 Children are
at particular risk because their smaller, less mature bodies make even
small doses of lead highly toxic. 2 38 Exposure generally occurs when
2 39
children ingest flakes or dust from old lead paint.

The recent suits against paint makers are arguably less justifiable
than those against cigarette makers. In the tobacco lawsuits, the defendant was an industry that grew rich selling dangerous products to
American consumers. Furthermore, the industry intentionally misled
the public about the health risks inherent in its products while knowing for decades of a link between smoking and disease.2 40 While cigarettes are legal products that many Americans voluntarily consume,
nicotine's addictive properties and cigarette makers' exploitation of
its addictiveness shift at least some of the blame from the plaintiffs to
the industry.
The proactive nature of the paint industry's response stands in
stark contrast to the decades-long campaign of deceit and deliberate
obfuscation waged by the tobacco industry. In the 1950s, when lead
paint use was still legal but concerns over its safety were surfacing, the

industry funded research to determine the dangerousness of its produCt. 24 1 Researchers indeed determined that lead paint was a health
hazard; nevertheless, the industry helped publicize the adverse findings. 2 42 The paint industry took further steps, voluntarily placing

warnings on its products and even beginning to phase lead paint out
entirely-all before the federal ban. 243 At least one court refused to
find the existence of a conspiracy within the paint industry to squelch
information of lead paint's dangers, ruling that there was "'no evi235

See PAULJ. BorrAin & MicHAEL L. BOurLOsA, A CONPwLm GuiDE

o LEAD PAirr

Kaminsky ed., 1998); Spake & Couzin, supra note 213,
at 54-56 (reporting on the dangers of lead paint to children, the cost of removal, and
Rhode Island's recent legal effort to receive compensation from paint manufacturers).
236 See 16 C.F.R. § 1303.1 (2000).
POISONING LITIGATION, at xviii (Alan

237

See BorrAmu & BOuLuOsA, supra note 235, app. A, at 164-67; Spake & Couzin, supra

note 213, at 54. A significant reason for the decrease in blood-lead levels of children since
the 1970s is the decline in the use of leaded gasoline. BorrAmu & BOULH-OSA, supra note
235, app. A, at 162 fig. 2-5.
238

See Bo-rrA

& BouLHosA, supra note 235, app. A, at 155-57.

239 See id. app. A, at 161-63. The problem is especially bad in Rhode Island, where in
1999 nearly one in five children entering kindergarten showed elevated blood-lead levels.
Flynn, supra note 229. Rhode Island's problem is significant, because 80% of its homes
predate the 1978 ban on lead paint. RL Sues Makers of Lead Paint,L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999,
at K6.
240 See supra Part I.C.2.
241 See Smith, supra note 15.
242 See Pendell, supra note 16; Smith, supra note 15.
243 See Pendell, supra note 16.
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dence whatsoever [that the industry's trade association] concealed
any studies, altered any documents or misrepresented any
2 44
finding."
Questions of causation also warrant a different treatment of paint
makers. Unlike cigarettes, lead paint is not inherently dangerous.2 45
In many cases, lead poisoning occurs in homes where the paint is not
well maintained, and children are often poisoned after digesting paint
2
chips that flake off peeling walls or after inhaling paint dust.

46

Paint

maker liability may therefore hinge on the actions of third parties responsible for maintaining the homes containing lead paint, such as
landlords, building supervisors, or public housing officials.2 4 7 A
child's developmental difficulties may be the result of factors other
than lead poisoning, including birth trauma and genetics. 2 48 The issue of time also dilutes lead paint makers' accountability. While cigarette makers continued their deception up until the point they were
sued,249 the deception with which the paint makers are charged oc0
curred in the 1920s and 1930s.5

Finally, it would be exceedingly difficult for a plaintiffs' la%%yer to
show which manufacturer's paint poisoned his client.-'5 Today, no
paint manufacturer produces lead paint, and some of the companies
that once produced it are no longer in business 2 -5-factsthat make
an attorney's job difficult and would require him to convince ajudge
to hold an entire industry liable for the actions of only some of its
Smith, supra note 15.
SeeThomasJ. Donohue, Editorial ....But LitigatingIsn't heAsalen, Bosro. GLOnE,
Nov. 22, 1999, at A13 (referring to a conclusion by the Environmental Protection Agency
that lead paint is not dangerous when well maintained).
246 See Cupp, supranote 14.
247 See Donohue, supra note 245.
248 See Bo-rrAm & BouuiosA, supra note 235, at 31 ("The mere fact that a child tests
positive for lead poisoning does not mean that any and all problems a child experiences
are attributable to his or her elevated blood-lead levels."). The mother's use of drugs,
cigarettes, or alcohol during pregnancy may also be the source of harm. &e i. at 29-30.
To establish a causal connection between a child's lead poisoning and developmental
problems, it may be useful to test the intelligence and cognitive functions of the child's
siblings and parents. See id. at 32-34.
The possibility that factors other than lead poisoning may have caused a child's developmental troubles makes class action lawsuits brought on behalf of injured children problematic. One may analogize a lead-poisoning class action to the Castano class action that
failed to gain certification for a group of plaintiffs that iras to include America's entire
population of addicted smokers. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. As the Fifth
Circuit explained in Castano,when the alleged injury is of a personal nature, courts hesitate to grant certification, because each plaintiffs harm is likely to turn on facts specific to
each individual. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
249 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
250 See Pendell, supranote 16.
251
Cupp, supra note 14.
252
See Pendell, supranote 16.
244
245
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members. 25 3 Such a recovery theory would closely resemble the mar2 1
ket share liability theory that has been successful in other contexts. 5
The market share liability theory releases a plaintiff from one of
the traditional tort law constraints: the burden of proving that a specific defendant caused the alleged harm. For most lead paint poisoning victims, whose homes were painted in the distant past by unknown

persons using untraceable paint, a theory that permits recovery without requiring identification of the precise tortfeasor holds an obvious
attraction. However, courts have so far rejected the application of the
market share theory to lawsuits involving lead paint. 25 5 The most recent court to do so was an intermediate appellate court in New York
state. 25 6 The court, while acknowledging the applicability of the mar-

ket share theory in certain tort actions involving prescription drugs,
distinguished lead paint poisoning victims, explaining that they could

not identify a sufficiently narrow time period in which to apply the
market share theory.2 57 Moreover, lead paint was not a generic, fungible product like the prescription drugs in previously successful market
share liability tort actions, and did not produce a signature injury to
which the paint could be incontrovertibly linked.2 58 The court concluded that the application of a market share theory on these facts
25 9
would result in "liability disproportionate to the risk created.)
253

See id,

In the 1970s and 1980s, makers of the prescription drug diethylstilbestrol (DES)
found themselves besieged by suits brought by classes of women alleging that they had
developed cancer as a result of their mothers' DES use during pregnancy. See Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 927-28 (Cal. 1980). Although the women could not name the
exact manufacturer of the drug that their mothers had ingested, courts in several states
allowed the women to recover on a theory of "market share" liability. See id. at 927 n.7,
937. Under this theory, DES manufacturers' liability would correspond to their respective
market shares during the period of injury. See id. at 937-38 (discussing the market share
theory along wvith the practical problems involved in defining the market and in assessing
market share). Acceptance of the market share liability theory was mixed. See, e.g., Tidier
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (refusing to employ a market share
theory in applying Maryland or District of Columbia law); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539
N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989) (adopting a market share theory). Courts endorsing the
theory, such as the NewYork Court of Appeals, considered it a fair method ofapportioning
blame as the liability will thereby "correspond to the over-all culpability of each defendant,
measured by the amount of risk of injury each defendant created to the public-at-large."
Hynowitz 539 N.E.2d at 1078.
255
See, e.g., Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 930 F. Supp. 241, 246-247 (E.D. La. 1996),
affd 106 F.3d 1245 (5th Cir. 1997).
256
See Brenner v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848 (App. Div. 1999).
257
See id. at 852-53.
258
Id. at 853. For similar reasons, the New York Court of Appeals recently held that
254

the market share theory of liability was also inapplicable in a suit brought by gunshot victims against gun manufacturers. See infra notes 301-03 and accompanying text.
259
699 N.Y.S.2d at 852. Although courts facing the issue of market share liability in a
lead paint context have so far rejected the argument, proposed legislation in Massachusetts, Maryland, and Rhode Island would expressly allow plaintiffs in lead paint poisoning
cases to proceed on a theory of market share liability. SeeJoe Maty, Industy CouldFaceSeries
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In their actions against the tobacco companies, plaintiffs' attorneys and state attorneys general justified their actions as a necessary
last resort in the face of legislative capitulation to cigarette makers.2 6o
However, in the case of the paint industry, federal, state, and local
governments have been very proactive. Every year, governmental entities provide millions of dollars to programs that reduce the threat of
lead poisoning 26 ' and support efforts to educate the public about the
risks that lead paint poses.2 6 2 Most importantly, the federal government took the ultimate action two decades ago by outlawing the sale
263
of the product in question-a step never taken with cigarettes.

Lead paint is certainly a danger, and lead poisoning a serious illness, but finding a party to blame appears difficult at best and a corpo-

rate lynching at worst. With these suits against the paint industry,
plaintiffs move deeper into territory where it becomes increasingly
2c
more difficult to uncover evidence of wrongdoing. '

2. Application of Tobacco Litigation Strategies Against Lead Paint
Makers

With adverse case law and an industry that appears to have acted
responsibly, why are trial lawyers attacking paint makers with legal theories usually reserved for tobacco companies? The likely answer is

that the lawyers know very well the weakness of their cases, but do not
plan to win on the merits. Instead, the attorneys may be using aggressive rhetoric in order to severely discredit the paint industry and inspire other plaintiffs to file similar suits against the industry. If
enough plaintiffs join the cause, paint makers will have to defend
of Challenges on Lead, IncludingLitigation,Legislation, P,,r'r& Co.,TwGS INDLuSTRy- May 2000,
at 114, available at 2000 WL 15560839.
260 See Nocera, supranote 7, at 39.
261
See Spake & Couzin, supra note 213, at 56.
262 See Pendell, supra note 16.
263

Id.

Taking the slippery-slope logic to its extreme, one commentator was inspired to
ask, "who's next?" Half-jokingly, he writes:
When we run out of socially unpopular products, such as cigarettes, guns
and latex, to go after in court, we'll have to be creative....
Some additional candidates could include cars and trucks, wlich, as we've
known for years, cause pollution. It's time they paid for irritating our eyes
and lungs. Some people are allergic to nuts, and while people could simply
avoid eating them, the latex glove case shos that states should make companies pay for producing foods or products that cause allergic reactions.
I'm sure states would sue beekeepers, too, if their pockets were deep
enough. Breweries, wineries and distilleries can't be far behind. Consumption of alcohol causes some people to lose their wits and harm themselves
and others.
State and local governments are limited only by their imaginations and
their greed.
Paul D. Winston, Editorial, Lets Win Onefor the Home Team, Bus. INs., Nov. 8, 1999, available
at 1999 WL 8769646.
264
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themselves on multiple fronts in multiple courts. Paint makers may
then choose the cheaper route of settlement over a costly litigation
265
strategy.
The success that can result from overextending one's opponent
was a lesson many of these same attorneys learned when they, along
with forty-six state attorneys general, forced the tobacco industry to
pay an enormous settlement before the plaintiffs' legal theories were
even tested in court.266 The sheer scope and breadth of the lawsuits
filed against the tobacco industry, and the fear that a judgment
against it would be large enough to cause bankruptcy, largely moti-

vated the cigarette makers to settle. 267 Plaintiffs in the paint industry
lawsuits hope that the same strategy will work against the paint makers, forcing the industry to settle before it can have its day in court. '' O
The strategy seems to be gaining momentum. Rhode Island's suit
against lead paint makers has induced similar suits by the cities of St.
Louis and Milwaukee, and by Santa Clara County, California. 2 69 In
addition, Chicago; Newark, NewJersey; and Providence, Rhode Island
270
appear ready to jump on the bandwagon.
The new style of class action is essentially a no-lose situation for
government plaintiffs. If they prevail, the government plaintiffs are
likely to collect millions of dollars. 27 1 On the other hand, if they fail,
the government plaintiffs and their taxpayers are unlikely to pay substantial legal fees because the private attorneys representing them
272
work on a contingency basis.
Besides presenting another front against which the industry must
defend, the participation of states and cities in a lawsuit brings credibility and a "moral authority" to the cause. 273 As a result, an industry
that initially appeared blameless slowly takes on an air of culpability as
the public authorities align themselves against it. Eventually, paint
265
266
267

See Smith, supra note 15.
See supra Part I.C.
See Cohen, supra note 85, at 46; Spake & Couzin, supra note 213, at 56; supra Part

I.C.
268

See Cupp, supranote 14. Normally, plaintiffs' lawyers could not afford to fund the

years of litigation needed to bring an entire industry to the bargaining table. See Field,
supra note 24, at 114. The new type of class action, however, is marked by a pooling of
resources among plaintiffs' attorneys. See Pamela Coyle, N.O. Lawyers Target HMO in Class
Action, TIMES-PIcAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 4, 2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL 6527494,
By combining their assets (a sizeable figure once tobacco settlement fees are added), plaintiffs' lawyers may survive protracted litigation against a wealthy opponent. See Smith, supra
note 15.
269
See Maty, supranote 259, at 114; Sara Hoffman Jurand, Ruling May Boost Lead Paint
Litigation, TRmI, June 1, 2001, at 19.
270

See id.

271
272
273

See Cupp, supra note 14.
See id.; supra Part I.C.1.
See supra Part I.C.1.
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makers, like HMOs and the tobacco companies before them, may find
themselves in the frustrating position of having the better legal argument, yet powerless to use it against this new form of class actionwhen victories in the courtroom count for little if tie industry has
already lost in the forum of public opinion.
B.

Class Action Lawsuits Against Gun Manufacturers

By the fall of 2000, dozens of cities and counties had filed suits
against the nation's gun industry. 274 Like the state attorne)s general
who preceded them in the tobacco litigation, these cities sought to
recover public expenditures made in response to the detrimental effects of an industry's harmful product, while trying at the same time to
2 75
reform a business that many consider criminal.
The many similarities between the tobacco and gun industries
make handgun manufacturers a natural target for the type of socialpolicy litigation that plaintiffs' attorneys unleashed against cigarette
makers. Like the tobacco industry, gun makers manufacture a product that has the potential to cause serious harm to its consumers and
to the public. Although firearms are heavily regulated,2 7 6 it is still possible for nearly anyone to buy a gun.2 77 The industry has managed to
circumvent highly restrictive federal and state legislation, resulting in
the same "something must be done" mentality of the public that fueled the tobacco litigation.2 78 Furthermore, gun makers, like cigarette companies, face accusations of knowingly manipulating their
marketing strategies in order to improve their bottom line at the cost
of public safety.2 79 Finally, the most important shared characteristic
274

See Frank Main, Judge Tosses Out Ciy's Gun Lawsuit, CI. StN-TtEs, Sept. 16, 2000,

at 1.
275

See FrankJ. Vandall, O.X Corralf: Polity Issues in MunicipalSuits Against Gun Manu-

facturers,44 Viu. L Ray. 547, 549 (1999); Main, supranote 274. The evils of gun violence,

especially American gun violence, have been headline news for years. On an average day,
for example, over fifteen American children die from gunfire; in an average year, gunfire
kills 35,000 Americans. Vandall, supra, at 548. Of these 35,000 dead, roughly 9,000 are
homicides-compared to merely a few dozen gun-related murders injapan and Great Brit-

ain combined. Id276 See Robert Levy, Editorial, Blackmail of Gun

oawrs, NT'L LJ.,Jn. 31, 2000, at A20.

277 See Kair)s, supranote 17, at 6.
278 Joan Biskupic, Juries Now Steering National Polity on Guns,Tobacco, TLres.-PIc\Lv.%E
(New Orleans), Sept. 2, 1999, at A12, available at 1999 WL 19764386.

279 See Kairys, supra note 17, at 10-12. Another similarity that gun companies share
with cigarette makers is the presence of internal company whistleblowers who are willing to
expose embarrassing industry secrets. Robert Hass, a former executive with Smith & Wesson, explained that gun makers are fully aware that many of their guns end up in the hands
of criminals because of the industry's refusal to investigate or regulate wholesale distributors and retailers known to be gun conduits for criminals. Sr- id. at 6.7 (citing Affidavit of
Robert I. Haas, 1 20-21, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (No.
CV-95-0049)).
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between tobacco and handgun companies is that they both sell legal
products that engender strong public disapproval.
Traditionally, gun makers have been immune from tort liability
for the simple reason that they did not pull the trigger.2 80 Just as

smokers were unable to overcome causation hurdles when suing cigarette companies, individual plaintiffs have had similar problems when
suing gun manufacturers. 28 1 For opponents of the tobacco industry,
four decades of almost universal defeat finally ended when a "blameless" plaintiff, not subject to the contributory-fault stigma that had
plagued individual plaintiff-smokers, sued and succeeded against the
industry. 28 2 The "blameless" plaintiff was state Medicaid agencies, and
2 83
the result was a $246 billion settlement.
Opponents of the tobacco industry found greater success in suits
brought by Medicaid, an agency indirectly harmed by smoking, than
suits brought by individual smokers. Similarly, opponents of gun
manufacturers are hoping that municipalities will have greater success
suing the industry than did individual victims of gun violence.2 84 The
plaintiff cities allege that the gun companies' marketing, distribution,
and promotional tactics had adverse and harmful effects. 285 The cities
seek compensation for expenditures arising from the criminal use of
handguns, namely, the costs of maintaining a police force, a court
2 86
system, and an emergency medical system.
Among the traditional tort claims available to the cities are public
nuisance, negligence, fraud, and product liability.28 7 One theory re280
281

See id. at 12-13.
See id.

See supra Part I.C.1.
See supra Part I.C.1. Because gun makers have been immune from tort liability, the
costs of gun violence have been borne by private and corporate taxpayers. Vandall, supra
note 275, at 552-53. Holding gun makers liable would shift that burden to the industry by
forcing them to internalize the costs of gun violence. See id. at 553. This internalization
would likely result in higher prices for guns, the bankruptcy of some gun companies, and
the withdrawal of certain guns from the market. See id. at 553-56.
284 Municipalities and counties that have initiated suits against gun manufacturers include Chicago (seeking $433 million in damages); Atlanta; Bridgeport, Connecticut; Cincinnati; New Orleans; and Miami-Dade County. See Main, supra note 274. Among these,
however, Bridgeport, Cincinnati, and Miami-Dade County have seen the courts dismiss
their suits. See id. Most recently, New Orleans's suit was dismissed when the Louisiana high
court ruled that a state law barring such suits may apply retroactively. Morial v. Smith &
Wesson Corp., 00-CA-1132 (La. 4/3/01), 785 So. 2d 1.
285 See Kairys, supranote 17, at 13.
282
283

286

See id.

287 See ia&at 13-16. First, advancing under a public nuisance theory, cities may argue
that gun manufacturers flood the legitimate gun market despite knowledge that guns are
thereby made readily available to criminals. Id at 14. Second, cities may press a claim of
negligence against the gun makers by arguing that the flooded handgun market is a result
of negligent marketing and distribution strategies. See id. at 15. A recent decision by the
New York Court of Appeals, however, has indicated that this theory may not be viable. See
infra notes 294-303 and accompanying text. Third, cities may bring their suits on a theory
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cently received approval from a federal judge in a personal-injury ac-

tion. In Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 288 a federal judge broke new ground
when he dismissed motions to set aside ajury verdict that had found a
group of gun manufacturers liable for the harm caused to one of the
plaintiffs, a victim of an accidental shooting involving an illegally ac-

quired handgun. 289 The theory that the jury adopted and that the
court approved was that many of the nation's handgun manufacturers
market and distribute their products negligently, resulting in the illegal acquisition of guns. 290 In reviewing the defendants' motions, the
court conducted an exhaustive analysis of the three necessary elements of a negligence claim-duty, breach, and causation,2 ' In assigning damages, the court adopted a market share liability theory292

of fraud, arguing that gun makers mislead the public into believing that a gun enhances
personal safety when in fact those who live in homes with a firearm arc at far greater risk of
injury than those who live in gun-free homes. Sce Kair), supra note 17, at 9-10, 15. Finally,
cities may sue under a product liability theory. Se idL
at 15-16. Although a suit alleging a
manufacturing defect could not succeed (because guns work exactly as intended), and a
suit under a traditional failure-to-warn theory would fail (because the open and obvious
dangers of handguns render warnings unnecessary), a suit may succeed if it alleges a
unique version of failure to warn. See id. Under this version, the plaintiffs would allege
that gun makers fail to warn handgun owners of the likelihood that their guns %illbe used
against themselves or family members. See idL
One commentator discusses a possible defense for gun manufacturers: superseding
cause. Vandall, supra note 275, at 565. In tort law, a superseding cause severs a defendant's liability when it is unforeseeable, when it leads to the plaintiff's harm, and when it
occurs after the defendant's negligent act. See id at 563-64. Gun makers may argue that
even if they were negligent in marketing their products, any liability the)' have to a gunshot
victim is superseded by unforeseeable criminal intervention. See id. at 565. The superseding-cause defense appears to have received tacit approval b)' a recent New York Court of

Appeals decision. See infra note 298 and accompan)ing text. Cities may counter that the
economic harm to the city is equally foreseeable whether the violence results from a legitimate handgun purchase or from a gun bought on the black market. &e Vandall, supra
note 275, at 565-66.
288 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
289 See i& at 808.09, 839.
290 See id. at 839; cf Timothy D. Lytton, Halberstam v. Daniel and the UntertainFutureof
Negligent Marketing Claims Against FirearnnsManufacturrs 64 BROOr. L RE%. 681 (1998).
Writing before the jury verdict in Hamilton, the author discusses the only other handgun
case to reach ajury on the grounds of negligent marketing. Thejury rejected plaintiffs'
claim as the plaintiffi "failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate the alleged link
between the arms industry and violent crime." Id. at 682.
291 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d. at 818-39. Beginning ith duty of care, the court
found that gun manufacturers, because of the inherent dangerousness of their products,
have a special relationship with those that their products foreseeably place in harm's x%ay.
See id. at 821. In addition, the court found that gun makers have "sufficient authority and
ability to control" the practices and conduct of downstream distributors and retailers in
order to improve potential victim safety. Id. The New York Court of Appeals, however, in
answering questions certified by the Second Circuit concerning duty under New York state
law, did not agree. See infra notes 294-303 and accompan)ing text.
292 See supra notes 254-59.
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and instructed the jury to apportion damages according to each de-

29 3
fendant's share of the national handgun market.

Following the jury's verdict, the defendants appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the gun makers owed no
duty to plaintiffs when marketing and distributing handguns. 2 4 The
Second Circuit, however, explained that the question of duty involved
balancing competing policies and could not be resolved by reviewing
New York state precedents. 295 Accordingly, the Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals: first, whether
the plaintiffs' negligent marketing theory was cognizable under New
York law; and second, whether damages could be apportioned among
29 6
the defendants on a market share basis.
In April of 2001, New York's high court answered both questions
in the negative. 2 97 The court explained that, notwithstanding the District Court's imposition of a duty of care upon gun manufacturers,
courts should hesitate before "extending liability to defendants for
their failure to control the conduct of others." 298 The New York
Court of Appeals reasoned that, before a duty could exist, there must
be a more tangible connection between a gun manufacturer and either the criminal wrongdoer or the victim, and that this relationship
must "realistically [place gun makers] in a position to prevent the
wrongs." 299 Moreover, the court noted that "we should be cautious in
imposing novel theories of tort liability while the difficult problem of
illegal gun sales in the United States remains the focus of a national
policy debate."30 0
Although the New York Court of Appeals concluded that gun
manufacturers did not owe a duty to the plaintiffs, the court proceeded to analyze the question of market share liability certified to
them.30 1 On this issue, the court found that the special situationjusti293 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 849-50. The court explained further that policy
reasons support placing the costs of gun violence on manufacturers rather than on individual victims, including the defendants' superior ability to absorb and minimize these costs.
See id. at 842. Commentators have further argued that losses which products cause should
fall on the party better able to avoid the accident. Vandall, supra note 275, at 569 (citing
an approach developed twenty years earlier byJudge Guido Calabresi). Although individual gun owners are best able to secure their guns, gun makers have more knowledge of and
ability to control the overall gun market. Id.Gun companies can make safer guns, pull
guns from the market, and raise their guns' market price. See id.
294
Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2000).
295
Id. at 42.
296 Id. at 39.
297 Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222, 231 (2001).
298 Id. at 232-33.
299 Id. at 234.
300

Id. at 240.

301

Id.
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fying the use of a market share theory of liability was not present. 3 0 2
Namely, there was no problem identifying the maker of a handgun
used in a crime (provided the handgun itself could be found), and
because gun makers market their products in different ways, each defendant exposed the plaintiffs to varying degrees of risk.Y30
The jury's verdict in Hamilton and the trial judge's subsequent
dismissal of the defendants' motions to set aside the verdict certainly
encouraged those cities that later brought suits against the gun-manufacturing industry.3 0 4 There is a crucial distinction, however, between

Hamilton and the two dozen city lawsuits. While Hamilton was a dass
action lawsuit brought by direct victims of gun violence, the cities' lawsuits assert the public's costs associated with gun violence as their injury.3 0 5 Damages of this nature are inherently indirect and, as such,

courts are likely to dismiss the cities' negligence claims for lack of
proximate cause. Moreover, in light of the New York Court of Appeals decision not to impose upon gun manufacturers a duty of reasonable care in the marketing of their products, the district court's
decision in Hamilton is likely to be overturned,300 further undermining the cities' suits.
Courts have already dismissed suits initiated by Bridgeport, Connecticut; Cincinnati, Ohio; and Miami-Dade County, Florida. 0 7 In
each case, the trial judges found that the plaintiffs lacked standing or
failed to state a cause of action.30 8 In dismissing the city of
Bridgeport's suit, the judge explained in detail the problems these
302

Id.

Id. at 240-41. For similar reasons, a New York appellate court also refused to apply
the market share theory of liability in a suit against former manufacturers of lead pigment
used in paint. See supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
304 See Main, supra note 274.
305 Vandall, supra note 275, at 549.
306 See Richard Perez-Pena, State CourtSides with Gun Mahlrsin Liabili " Cas, N.Y. TatEts,
Apr. 27, 2001, at Al.
307
Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. CV 990153198S, 1999 WL 1241909 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 1999) (dismissing city of Bridgeport's suit); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., No. A9902369, 1999 WIL 809838 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Oct. 7, 1999) (dismissing city
of Cincinnati's suit), afT'd, Nos. C-990729, C-990814, C-990815, 2000 NL 1133078 (Ohio Ct.
App. Aug. 11, 2000), appeal allowed, 740 N.E.2d 1111 (Ohio 2001); Penelas v. Arms Tech.,
Inc., No. 99-1941 CA-06, 1999 WL 1204353 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999) (dismissing MiamiDade County's suit), affd, No. 3D00-113, 2001 V.. 120529 (Fla. Dist. CL App. Feb. 14,
303

2001).

308 See Smith & Ilsson, 1999 WL 1241909, at *2; Berdta, 1999 WL 809838, at 01; Arrs
Tech., 1999 VL 1204353, at *2. A suit that Chicago initiated recendyjoined the ranks of
other gun industry suits to be thrown out of court. Se Main, supra note 274. In that case,
the city of Chicago asserted theories of negligence and public nuisance, but the judge
seemed to suggest that the issue was one better left to legislators. Se id. In other parts of
the country, results have been mixed, with lawsuits filed by various cities and counties in
California, as well as the cities of Detroit, Atlanta, Boston, and Cleveland going forward.
See Pam Belluck, Chicago Gun Suit Fails,but Caifornia'gProt&A, N.Y. Ttrs, Sept. 16, 2000,
atA9.
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types of suits raise.30 9 Unlike the states that filed suit against the tobacco industry, the cities in the gun litigation do not have statutory
authority to sue.3 10 In the tobacco litigation, states had standing to
sue via either state statute or their sovereign right to protect their citizens' welfare.3 1 1 In the Bridgeport case, there was no statute authorizing the city's suit nor, as a municipality, did Bridgeport possess the
3 12
rights associated with state sovereignty.
In addition, the city of Bridgeport was unable to rest its case on
common law tort principles. 3 13 The court explained that, despite

Bridgeport's apparent belief that the tobacco litigation marked the
"dawning of a new age of litigation," a plaintiff must still show proximate cause and an injury that is not remote in order to recover. 3 14 In
the case of a municipality's suit against gun manufacturers, the increase to a city's budget allegedly caused by a defendant's handguns
will not suffice to establish proximate cause.3 15 Likewise, expenditures that are purely contingent upon harm to third parties are too
remote to be recoverable.3 16 The court explained that the appropriate plaintiffs to recover from the gun manufacturers might be
3 17
Bridgeport citizens themselves.
See Smith & Wesson, 1999 WL 1241909, at *5-*8.
Id at *4-*5.
311
Id.
312 Id. at *7.
313
Id. at *9-*10.
314 Id. at *5.
315
Id. at *9.
316 Id.
317 Id at *11; see also Beretta, 1999 WL 809838, at *3 (barring the city of Cincinnati's
claims based on the "doctrine of remoteness"). In dismissing Cincinnati's suit, the court
explained that
the City's complaint is an improper attempt to have this Court substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature, something which this Court is neither
inclined nor empowered to do. Only the legislature has the power to engage in the type of regulation which is being sought by the City here.
Id at *1. The city of Cincinnati alleged many of the wrongs that are typical among these
types of lawsuits, including negligent marketing methods, public nuisance, and unjust enrichment See id at *2-*3. In dismissing these claims, the Ohio court found that no special
relationship existed between gun makers and the city of Cincinnati that would require the
gun makers to protect the city, rendering a negligence claim insupportable. See id. -it *2.
In rejecting the city's public nuisance claim, the judge explained that "public nuisance
simply does not apply to the design, manufacture and distribution of a lawful product." &d.
at *2. As for the city's theory of unjust enrichment, the court held that the city's expenditures arose from the city's duty to protect its citizens, and did not confer a benefit to the
defendants. Id at *3.In addition, the losses that its citizens suffered were too remote to
be compensable to the city. Id
In rejecting the Miami-Dade County lawsuit, the Florida trial judge held that the
county did not have standing to sue and explained that the right to sue gun makers for
negligence and product liability lies with "a specific plaintiff who alleges a specific harm."
Arms Tech., 1999 WL 1204353, at *3.
309

310
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As with the tobacco lawsuits, the plaintiffs' attorneys in the gun
industry lawsuits are arguably less concerned with succeeding on the
merits of their novel legal theories than with aligning a group of plaintiffs so large that their opponent buckles under the enormous economic pressure.3 18 Coming on the heels of the tobacco litigation as
these suits do, the plaintiffs' attorneys cannot help but be aware of the

leverage that public entities bring in a suit against an unpopular corporate defendant. The Pittsburgh City Council took heed of this perspective when it offered to drop its suit if gun makers would agree to
install trigger locks.3 19 Ultimately, the gun industry may fold in the
face of high legal costs associated with defending itself in multiple
suits in various courts, just as the much wealthier tobacco companies
320
did just a few years ago.
Not only are the merits of the gun industry lawsuits dubious, but
these suits, along with those against HMOs and the paint industry,
raise policy questions similar to those provoked by the tobacco litigation-questions that extend beyond the parties involved. One may
question whether it is fair to force a defendant to the bargaining table
on an untested legal theory simply because the defendant cannot afford to maintain its defense or pay for an adverse judgment.3 2 1 Addi318

Levy, supra note 276.
Senate Aims to Ban Gun Suits, LuaQksrm

NEW ERA% (Pa.), No%'. 17, 1999, at A3, atailable at 1999 WL 6488650.
320
See Levy, supra note 276.
321
In March 2000 Smith & Wesson, one of the nation's leading gun makers, signed a
code-of-conduct agreement with federal regulators in which it promised to equip its firearms with trigger locks and accept a higher level of regulatory oversight. See Gary Fields,
For Smith & Wesson, Blanks Instead of a Magic Bule4 WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2000, at A24. In
319

return, the gun maker had hoped to escape from the government lamsuits filed against the
industry. I&. According to Yale Law School professor Peter Schuck, Smith &Wesson had a

strong legal argument available for trial. See Barry Meir, BringingLasuits to Do lt Congress Won't, N.Y. TLm, Mar. 26, 2000, § 4, at 3. Nevertheless, tie financial pressure of
funding a legal defense brought Smith & Wesson to the bargaining table. See id.
Hope may be on the horizon for some gun makers. Several state legislatures have
recently passed statutes restricting municipalities' ability to sue gun manufacturers, reserving that right to the state. See, eg., 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 1058 (codified at CoLo. RE%.
STAT. § 13-21-504.5 (2000)); 2000 Va. Acts ch. 674 (codified at V,. CODE Anx. § 15.2-915.1
(Michie Supp. 2000)); see also Megan Twohey, Guinights at the State Corrals, NT'Lj.,July 22,
2000 (describing legislation passed in nventy-three states that would prohibit cities from
suing gun manufacturers and distributors), available at 2000 NVL 6437541.
A recent decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court, which dismissed a lawsuit brought
by New Orleans against the gun industry, demonstrates the success that these statutes may
have in preventing such suits in the future-or even deacti%ating those suits that have
already been filed. See Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 00-CA-1 132 (La. 4/3/01), 785 So.
2d 1 (holding that state legislation may retroactively bar lasuit by a city against gun manufacturers because the city, as a political subdivision of state, is not entitled to the protections afforded by Due Process and Contract Clauses of federal and state constitutions);
Richard B. Schmitt, Antigun Lawsuit Gets Thrown Out bs, Louisiana Court,WIu.L Sr.J., Apr. 4,
2001, at B8 (discussing Louisiana Supreme Court decision).
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tionally, one may ask whether plaintiffs' lawyers should be the
champions of social policy.
Perhaps most fundamental is that these lawsuits attempt to turn
over to the courts what should be legislative policy decisions. If successful, these class action lawsuits will affect the goods and services
that consumers purchase by forcing the targeted industries to change
their business practices. In addition, the industries will most likely
pass on to the consumer any costs of litigation, judgment, or settlement. In other words, the class action lawsuits essentially co-opt legislative functions by imposing a tax on consumers and by regulating
whole industries.
V
LITIGATION AS PUBLIC POLICY

In considering the outcome of the pending lawsuits against
HMOs, gun manufacturers, and paint makers, it is useful to look to
the tobacco litigation as a model. Although the class action lawsuits
filed on behalf of injured smokers appear to be foundering (with the
exception of the recent Florida judgment),322 other innovative litigation tactics that plaintiffs have brought to bear against the tobacco
industry in recent years have resulted in enormous settlements. 323
However, before deeming the third wave of tobacco litigation a success, two important questions require resolution. First, despite the billions of dollars the state Medicaid suits extracted from tobacco
companies, did the litigation allow the states to achieve their public
policy goals? Second, and more fundamentally, should courts decide
questions of public health policy that are traditionally reserved for
elected legislators?
The tobacco settlement not only awarded states billions of dollars, but required the tobacco companies to limit outdoor advertisement of their products, contribute to research intended to help
smokers quit, and establish a program to reduce teen smoking.32 4 For
the tobacco companies, the settlement promised to end the state
Medicaid suits and provide more certainty about the industry's future
litigation costs. 3 25 As a sign of its approval of the deal, the financial

markets pushed share prices for tobacco companies higher in antici3 26
pation of the settlement.
Is this result adequate? When the attorneys general first announced their suits, they promised to save American children from

324

See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.
See Tobacco Settlemen4 supranote 1, at 5.

325

See id&

326

See Geyelin, supra note 182.

322
323
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smoking and achieve regulatory restrictions on cigarettes.3 2 7 Indeed,
these broader public health policies were part of a more ambitious
settlement agreement that circulated during June 1997.328 This earlier proposal not only raised the price tag for tobacco companies to
over $350 billion, but would have garnered more significant concessions from the tobacco industry, including consent to FDA regulation

of cigarettes and further restrictions on cigarette advertising in stores
and magazines.3 29 The proposal would have required Congressional
approval. 33 0 Congress's failure to approve the earlier settlement proposal ultimately led to the much less comprehensive agreement of late
1998.331
The history of the tobacco settlement highlights the ineffectiveness of using litigation to achieve public policy goals.3 3 2 A primary
goal of litigation is to compensate an aggrieved party for past
wrongs,33 3 and can cause a plaintiff's focus to shift from public policy
objectives to monetary damages. The tobacco settlement fell into this
trap because the final settlement agreement failed to include any significant concessions from the tobacco industry that would improve
public health. 334 Even a $400 billion settlement seems meager to
327 See Peter D.Jacobson & Kenneth E. Warner, Litigation and PublicHealth Polity AM.
ing- The Case of Tobacco Contro 24J. HEALTH PoL POL'w & L 769, 780 (1999). The authors
find that the state attorneys general initially pursued four primary goals: (1) to protect
children, (2) to disclose evidence of the adverse affects of smoking by releasing tobacco
industry documents obtained through litigation, (3) to reform the advertising and business
practices of the tobacco industry, and (4) to recover the states' tobacco-related health care
expenditures. The authors find additional public-policy objectives "embedded" within the
preceding four goals: (1) allowing for FDA regulation of tobacco, (2) funding programs to
reduce teen smoking, (3) finding a public education campaign, (4) improving tobacco
labeling, (5) disclosing more industry documents, and (6) compensating the states and
individuals for tobacco-related diseases and the costs of quitting smoking. &e id. Measured against this ambitious list, the state attomeys general achieved only a minority of
their goals.
328 See Tobacco Settlemen, supra note 1, at 1.
329 See Player, supra note 29, at 339; Tobacco Sttlernent, supranote 1, at 1. The "global"
settlement that cigarette makers and state attorneys general nearly reached would have
meant a victory for the tobacco industry despite its $368 billion cost because it 'prohibit[ed] the use of the very legal tactics that had brought the companies to the table."
Daynard & Kelder, supra note 30, at 34. How sweeping %as the "global" settlement? With
the agreement, the tobacco industry made clear that it "[did] not plan to enter a courtroom again in defense of its product." Player, supra note 29, at 340.
330
See Player, supra note 29, at 340.
331 See Geyelin, supra note 182.
332
See, eg., Jacobson & Warner, supra note 327, at 795-97 (discussing various objections to judicial policymaking).
333 Id. at 772-73. Jacobson and Warner envision three functions for civil tort litigation:
compensation, deterrence, and accountability. Id. at 772. Following this paradigm, the
state attorneys general used litigation to recover monetary damages resulting from the
costs of treating tobacco-related diseases, to deter the tobacco industry from producing
and marketing harmful products, and to seek punitive damages that would hold tobacco
companies accountable for their actions. Id. at 772-73.
334 See id. at 772.
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some critics, who point to the hundreds of thousands of lives that cigarettes prematurely ended. 3 35 Public health officials are also disappointed because much of that enormous sum of money will not go to
smoking prevention programs as initially promised, but rather will
flow into various public works projects. 33 6 Today, the tobacco companies remain viable, and critics believe that the settlement could have

been much higher. 337 Now that state governments are set to receive
payments from the tobacco industry, one may even argue that states
have an interest in seeing cigarette companies maintain a healthy cash
flow. Thus, it would appear that the industry essentially bought a license to continue business as usual, a reality that many state attorneys
general might have considered unacceptable as a policy objective
338
when the Medicaid suits began.
Despite the dubious result of the tobacco agreement, proponents
are once again trumpeting litigation as the panacea for resolving
problematic issues in American health policy. As plaintiffs file class
action lawsuits against HMOs, gun manufacturers, and the former
makers of lead paint, one must pay careful attention to the propriety
of permitting the courts to perform legislative functions. In the American governmental scheme, characterized by a distinct separation of
governmental powers, it is clearly the prerogative of the legislature
and the executive's regulatory agencies to set public policy, and it is
the courts' duty to discern and respect the intent of these governing
bodies. 339
335 See Daynard & Kelder, supra note 30, at 38.
336 See David Stout, Few States Are Using Settlements in Tobacco Suit to Cut Smolng N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 25, 1999, at A12.
337 Daynard & Kelder, supra note 30, at 38. The authors estimate that the industry's
collective annual pretax income is about $7.7 billion, and could be as much as $32 billion
if cigarette makers raise cigarette prices. Id.
338 Several commentators have also questioned whether the settlement met the states'
stated policy objectives. See, e.g., Jacobson & Warner, supra note 327, at 801-02 (arguing
that the Medicaid litigation stemmed from a desire to achieve broad public health goals,
but realized only modest policy measures and monetary damages, partially because of the
weakness of litigation as a vehicle for fundamental social change); Daynard & Kelder, supra
note 30, at 38 (arguing that a cash settlement of even $400 billion would pale in comparl.
son to the trillions of dollars in damage that the tobacco industry has inflicted upon Americans). But see Hyman, supra note 76, at 38 (arguing that the tobacco settlement was unfair
to the industry because states sought to recover their total smoking-related costs rather
than their incremental costs attributable to smoking). Hyman argues that the states, when
estimating their Medicaid expenses, should have factored in the savings realized from
smokers' premature deaths in the form of forgone pensions, Social Security, and Medicaid
payments. Id.
339 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 864,
865-66 (1984) (explaining that courts have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made
by the political branches of government); see alsoAbbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 938 (1st
Cir. 1997) ("[W]e begin with the words of the statute, and we approach them with an
understanding that our role is not to set public policy, but, rather, to discern the legislature's will."), vacated by 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
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The often unelected nature of the judiciary undercuts the idea of
allowing judges to formulate policy affecting the nation as a whole.
Although judges may be objective, without their own constituencies
there is no guarantee that judges will hear or even consider a diverse
range of opinions and alternatives.340 The structure of the judiciary
also does not allow it to serve as an appropriate forum for the resolution of policy disputes. 341 Without investigatory and research re-

sources, a court's opinion is likely less informed than that of a
legislature or an executive agency. 342 Devising a regulatory regime
also requires the analysis of complex data and conflicting theories,
tasks that regulatory agencies with their specialized expertise are better suited to perform.3
There are also institutional limits on the ability of juries and the
litigants themselves to successfully use litigation to construct public
policy. Although ajury may be somewhat more representative than a
lone judge, any jury faced with a complex case involving public policy
issues would suffer from the same infirmities as ajudge: lack of expertise and an inability to hear a broad range of viewpoints3 ' t Moreover,
most litigation results in settlement before ajudge has an opportunity
to issue a final ruling or ajury is able to render a verdicL 3
Finally,
settlements often do not incorporate interests beyond those that are
important to the litigants.3 46 A settlement's terms may also result
from a disparity in the bargaining power between the negotiating parties, preventing a "fair balancing of the relev-ant policy
347
considerations."
In contrast to the various players in the litigation arena, legisla-

tures are well qualified to craft regulatory schemes. Legislatures,
through committees and administrative agencies, have the resources
and expertise needed to conduct thorough research." 8 To the extent
that research and debate fail to generate a clear solution, legislators,
as elected representatives, have the authority to make political judgments and to reach a consensus that theoretically represents the majority's will.1 9 Moreover, unlike the litigation context, in which only
340

See Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Mantufadurersfor Cime-Ratled Inju-

i-ts: Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System
REv. 1, 53-54, 73-74 (2000).
341
See Roland, supra note 117, at 1531.

in Regulating the lirearmsIndusry. 65 Mo. L

342
343

See Lytton, supra note 340, at 53-54, 73-74.

344

See Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A ComparalhveInstitutional

See i&2

Analysis, 32 CooNN. L REV. 1247, 1272-73 (2000).
345 Id. at 1259.
346

Id. at 1270.

347
348

Id,

349

See id at 73.

See Lytton, supra note 340, at 53-54, 7-74.
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the plaintiffs and defendant's arguments are heard, legislatures serve
as a forum in which more parties have a voice, either through testimony, lobbying groups, a letter to a legislator, or the ballot box. -550
Finally, legislatures may defer judgment, return to an issue after time
35 1
has passed, and modify programs after their implementation.
By assuming the role of the legislatures, the courts intrude upon
the constitutional territory of another governmental branch. 5 2 The
form that gun, tobacco, and health care regulation should take is a
divisive issue. Legislatures should therefore resolve the issue so that
many viewpoints can be presented and a legitimate consensus
reached. 353 In contrast, when municipal governments and state attorneys general advance lawsuits against targeted industries, the only discernible voice is that of the executive. 54 Legislators who tolerate this
action, perhaps because enough of them agree with the executive's
position, will hasten the erosion of power of their own branch of
government. 3555
On the other hand, appealing arguments can be made for allowing litigation to set public policy.356 These arguments, however,
often focus on the failures of other governmental branches rather
than on the inherent proficiency of courts to design social policy.5 5 7
For example, in the area of tobacco, Congress and state legislatures, as
well as federal regulatory agencies, failed to construct anything but
the most rudimentary tobacco regulatory scheme. 358 According to
some commentators, these governmental branches have succumbed
to the tobacco industry's allies and are therefore incapable of re-

350

See Lytton, supra note 344, at 1251.

351 See Lytton, supra note 340, at 52, 73.
352 SeeJonathan Turley, A risisof Faith: Tobacco and the MadisonianDemocracy, 37 HAv.
J. ON LEGIS. 433, 466-67 (2000).

353

See id. at 452-54.
Id. at 466-67.
355 Id. at 467. At both the state and federal levels, legislatures have "power of the
purse." Id. at 466. Using this power, legislatures can halt the executive branch's encroachment by cutting off the funding for their lawsuits. Id. In addition to raising separation-ofpowers concerns, the government-sponsored lawsuits represent taxation through litigation.
See William H. PryorJr., A Comparison of Abuses and Reforms of Class Actions and Multigovern
ment Lawsuits, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1885, 1898 (2000). In their suits against gun manufacturers,
municipalities seek to recoup money spent on providing government services. It is the job
of the legislatures, however, to raise money for public programs. James H. Warner, Munici354

pal Anti-Gun Lawsuits: How QuestionableLitigation Substitutesfor Legislation, 10 SaroN I-L.
CONST. L.J. 775, 778 (2000).

356

SeeJacobson & Warner, supra note 327, at 793-95.

357

See id. at 793.

358 See id.at 774-75, 793. The authors state that "[tihe political system had not attained
the policy outcomes that the attorneys general believed were desirable and that they anticipated litigation would provide." Ia at 777.
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sponding to the public's need.3 5 9 Resort to the courts, therefore, became a necessary and final alternative. Another rationale in support
of policy through litigation is that legislatures are peculiarly inactive in
the area of public health law because individual constituents are naturally more concerned with their own immediate health than with
threats to the health of the overall population.3 6 0 In addition, litigation's discovery mechanism proved very effective in revealing to the
American public the fraudulent practices of the tobacco companies.
Some would argue thatjudicially-backed discovery may be effective in
inducing other industries to reveal what they otherwise would not. 6 1
Opponents of this view argue that when democratically elected
representatives choose not to implement regulations, it is not because
they are "captured" by powerful lobbyist groups, but because they are
simply better informed or have a greater awareness of the larger political context 362 As one commentator argued, it is unfair to allow
groups who "have lost in the legislative and regulatory arenas [to]
turn to the courts ... for a third, unaccountable bite at the policymaking apple."3 63 Resorting to the countermajoritarian courts rather
than allowing the elected representatives to determine the policies by
which the public is bound subverts the democratic process.
Sifting through the various arguments, it is difficult to construct a
compelling case in favor of any of the lawsuits currently pending
against HMOs, gun companies, and the former makers of lead paint.

The pitfalls of the tobacco litigation, notably an inability to effect real
change and the denial of a defendant's day in court, are present in
each lawsuit. Moreover, the rationales in support of the tobacco litigation do not apply to the more recent suits. Unlike the paralysis that
governments exhibited during the tobacco debate, state and federal
entities have not remained inactive in the face of health care abuses,
handgun violence, or lead paint poisoning.3 64 Although governmental responses have varied according to the challenge confronted, pro359 See id.
at 793 ("[Tobacco litigation supporters] argue that the industry has a stranglehold on the bureaucracies charged with regulating cigarette-related health and safety
matters."); Matthew Baldini, Comment, The CigaretteBattle:Anti-Srnod:ingProponertsCofor the
Knockout, 26 SErON HALL L Rnv. 348, 363-64 (1995) (discussing the strength of the tobacco
lobby).
360 See Wendy E. Parmet, Tobacco, HIV, and the Courtroom: The Role of Affinnatie Litigation in the Formationof PublicHealth Poliy, 36 Hous. L RE%. 1663, 1692-93 (1999).
361 See id.at 1696-97.
362 See Marshall B. Kapp, Tobacco Litigation, Round Three: It's the Monru " and the Prinipe,
24J. Hr.mA-H POL PoL'Y & L 811, 813 (1999).
363 Id. at 812-13.
364 See, eg., supranotes 169-71 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's efforts to
pass a patients' rights bill and various state legislation aimed at improving patient care);
supratext accompanying note 263 (discussing the federal ban on lead paint).
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posals are moving forward, rendering any circumvention of the
legislative process unjustified.
If public policy decisions are to be kept out of the courts, it is
necessary to prevent plaintiffs' attorneys from steamrolling other industries into settlement negotiations. The keystone to the success of
the four classes of suits examined in this Note was the involvement of
a public entity as plaintiff. Once a governmental entityjoins a suit, its
presence lends legitimacy to the plaintiffs' claims. This legitimacy
serves as the critical mass needed to demonize an industry in the public's mind, after which the filing of lawsuits by more cities, counties,
and states is virtually assured. Faced with such an overwhelming assault, an industry cannot afford to defend itself and will capitulate well
before it can test its defenses in court. Therefore, a solution to this
snowball effect must focus on the alliances formed between public entities and private attorneys. Bans on contingency fee agreements between state governments and private attorneys can stymie
multigovernmental lawsuits. 365 This prohibition would require a governmental entity to appeal to the legislature for funding to advance its
lawsuits, thus allowing a diverse body of elected representatives to consider the wisdom of using the proposed litigation to achieve the de3 66
sired policy goal.

CONCLUSION

The tobacco litigation christened a new form of class action in
which teams of well-financed lawyers representing thousands, even
millions, of individuals attempt to expose an entire industry to liability
so expansive that it will capitulate and settle before the plaintiffs' legal
theories are even tested in court. In the case of the Medicaid reimbursement suits filed against the major tobacco companies, plaintiffs'
lawyers allied themselves with state attorneys general, who brought
"moral authority" to the confrontation. In addition, these plaintiffs'
attorneys supplemented their dubious legal arguments by going after
their opponents where it counts most-the bottom line. The result of
this multipronged strategy was a startling and unprecedented damage
settlement. Whether or not this strategy was fair to the tobacco companies, many of the same lawyers who challenged the tobacco industry
are seeking to duplicate their success by taking on other industries
365

See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After Tobacco: Is the

Domino Effect for Lead Paint Manufacturersand Others Fair Game?, 27 PEPP. L. RE . 685, 698
(2000); see alsoMICHAEL I. KRAUSS, FIRE & SMoKE: GOVERNMENT, L,WSUITS AND THIE RuLE QO
LAW 39 (2000) (describing contingency fee arrangements between the government amd
private attorneys as unethical).
366 See Cupp, supra note 365, at 698.
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they consider to have wronged the American public-particularly the
health care, gun manufacturing, and paint industries.
Although the tobacco litigation and its end result may bejustifiable, it was a fountainhead of wrongheaded litigation. The subsequent
lawsuits target industries that are much less culpable than cigarette
makers. As was the case with the tobacco suits, the litigation these
industries now face seeks to fundamentally alter and extract enormous damages from unpopular but entirely legal industries. This development presents the pressing question of whether it is wise-or
even constitutional-to allow class action and governmental plaintiffs
to use the court system to formulate public policy, rather than pursuing reform through the more representative branches of government.

